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The fifth edition of the Contactforum “Actuarial and Financial Mathematics Day” attracted 
many participants, both researchers and practitioners. We welcomed this year several 
participants from abroad, indicating that this event is becoming to be known internationally. 
This contactforum aims to bring together young researchers, in particular Ph.D. students and 
Postdocs, working in the field of Financial and Actuarial Mathematics to discuss recent 
developments in the theory of mathematical finance and insurance and its application to 
current issues faced by the industry and to identify the substantive problems confronting 
academic researchers and finance professionals. We provide a forum for the discussion of 
advances within this field. In particular, we want to promote the exchange of ideas between 
practitioners and academics. 
Renowned practitioners were programmed as main speakers in order to give them a forum to 
talk about the needs, the problems, the hot topics in their fields. The invited paper about risk 
measures is included in these transactions. 
 
We thank all our speakers and discussants (Jasper Anderluh, Katrien Antonio, Griselda 
Deelstra, Henrik Jönsson, Nele Vandaele, Maarten Van Wieren, David Vyncke), for their 
enthusiasm and their interesting contributions which made this day a great success. We are 
also extremely grateful to our sponsors: the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science 
and Arts, and Scientific Research Network “Fundamental Methods and Techniques in 
Mathematics” of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders. They made it possible to spend 
the day in a very agreeable and inspiring environment. 
 
We plan a two day international event for the next meeting in 2008 with the focus on the 
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 INVITED TALKCAPITAL ALLOCATION WITH RISK MEASURES
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Abstract
This brief review paper covers the use of risk measures for assessing economic capital require-
ments and considers the problem of allocating aggregate capital to sub-portfolios.
1. INTRODUCTION
A risk measure is a function that assigns real numbers to random variables representing uncertain
pay-offs, e.g. insurance losses. The interpretation of a risk measure’s outcome depends on the
context in which it is used. Historically there have been three main areas of application of risk
measures:
• As representations of risk aversion in asset pricing models, with a leading paradigm the use
of the variance as a risk measure in Markowitz portfolio theory, see Markowitz (1952).
• As tools for the calculation of the insurance price corresponding to a risk. Under this in-
terpretation, risk measures are called premium calculation principles in the classic actuarial
literature, e.g. Goovaerts et al. (1984).
• As quantiﬁers of the economic capital that the holder of a particular portfolio or risks should
safely invest in e.g. Artzner et al. (1999).
This contribution is mainly concerned with the latter interpretation of risk measures.
The economic or risk capital held by a (re)insurer corresponds to the level of safely invested
assets used to protect itself against unexpected volatility of its portfolio’s outcome. One has to
distinguish economic capital from regulatory capital, which is the minimum required economic
capital level as set by the regulator. In fact, much of the impetus for the use of risk measures in
the quantiﬁcation of capital requirements comes from the area of regulating ﬁnancial institutions.
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Banking supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) and, increasingly, insurance reg-
ulation (European Commission) have been promoting the development of companies’ internal
models for modelling risk exposures. In that context, the application of a risk measure (most
prominently Value-at-Risk) on the modelled aggregate risk proﬁle of the insurance company is
required.
Economic capital generally exceeds the minimum set by the regulator. Subject to that con-
straint, economic capital is determined so as to maximise performance metrics for the insurance
company, such as total shareholder return (Exley and Smith 2006). Such maximisation takes into
account two conﬂicting effects of economic capital (Hancock et al. 2001):
• An insurance company’s holding economic capital incurs costs for its shareholders, which
can be opportunity or frictional costs.
• Economic capital reduces the probability of default of the company as well as the severity
of such default on its policyholders. This enables the insurance company to obtain a better
rating of its ﬁnancial strength and thereby attract more insurance business at higher prices.
Calculation of the optimal level of economic capital using such arguments is quite complicated
and depends on factors that are not always easy to quantify, such as frictional capital costs, and
on further constraints, such as the ability of an insurance company to raise capital in a particular
economic and regulatory environment.
We could however consider that there is a particular calibration of the (regulatory or other)
risk measure, which gives for the insurance company’s exposure a level of economic capital that
coincides with that actually held by the company. In that sense risk measures can be used to
interpret exogenouslygiven economiccapital amounts. Such interpretation can be in the context of
capital being set to achieve a target rating, often associated with a particular probability of default.
Discussion of economic capital in the context of risk measures should therefore be caveated as
being ex-post.
Finally, we note that the level of economic capital calculated by a risk measure may be a
notional amount, as the company will generally not invest all its surplus in risk-free assets. This
can be dealt with by absorbing the volatility of asset returns in the risk capital calculation itself.
2. DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES OF RISK MEASURES
We consider a set of risks X that the insurance company can be exposed to. The elements X ∈ X
are random variables, representing losses at a ﬁxed time horizon T. If under a particular state of
the world ω the variable X(ω) > 0 we will consider this to be a loss, while negative outcomes
will be considered as gains. For convenience it is assumed throughout that the return from risk-
free investment is 1 or alternatively that all losses in X are discounted at the risk-free rate. A risk
measure ρ is then deﬁned as a functional
ρ : X  → R. (1)
IfX correspondstotheaggregatenetriskexposureofan insurancecompany(i.e. thedifference
between liabilities and assets, excluding economic capital) and economic capital corresponds to
ρ(X), then we assume that the company defaults when X > ρ(X).Capital allocation 5
In the terminology of Artzner et al. (1999) (and subject to some simpliﬁcation), a risky position
X is called acceptable if ρ(X) < 0, implying that some capital may be released without endan-
gering the security of the holder of X, while ρ(X) ≥ 0 means that X is a non-acceptable position
and that some capital has to be added to it.
Some examples of simple risk measures proposed in the actuarial and ﬁnancial literature (e.g.
B¨ uhlmann (1970), Denuit et al. (2005)) are as follows.
Example 1 (Expected value principle)
ρ(X) = λE[X], λ ≥ 1. (2)
Besides its application in insurance pricing, where it represents a proportional loading, this risk
measure in essence underlies simple regulatory minimum requirements, such as the current EU
Solvency rules, which determine capital as a proportion of an exposure measure such as premium.
Example 2 (Standard deviation principle)
ρ(X) = E[X] + κσ[X], κ ≥ 0. (3)
In this case the loading is risk-sensitive, as it is a proportion of the standard deviation. This risk
measure is encountered in reinsurance pricing, while also relating to Markowitz portfolio theory.
In the context of economic capital, it is usually derived as an approximation to other risk measures,
with this approximation being accurate for the special case of multivariate normal (more generally
elliptical) distributions (Embrechts et al. 2002).





aX], a > 0. (4)
The exponential premium principle is a very popular risk measure in the actuarial literature, e.g.
Gerber (1974). Part of the popularity stems from the fact that, in the classic ruin problem, it gives
the required level of premium associated with Kramer-Lundberg bounds for ruin probabilities. We
note that this risk measure has been recently considered in the ﬁnance literature under the name
‘entropic risk measure’ (F¨ ollmer and Schied 2002b).
Example 4 (Value-at-Risk)
ρ(X) = VaRp(X) = F
−1
X (p), p ∈ (0,1), (5)
whereFX isthecumulativeprobabilitydistributionofX and F
−1
X is its(pseudo-)inverse. VaRp(X)
is easily interpreted as the amount of capital that, when added to the risk X, limits the probability
of default to 1 − p. Partly because of its intuitive attractiveness Value-at-Risk has become the
risk measure of choice for both banking and insurance regulators. For example, the UK regu-
latory regime for insurers uses VaR0.995(X) (Financial Services Authority), while a similar risk
measure has been be proposed in the context of the new EU-wide Solvency II regime (European
Commission).6 A. Tsanakas
Example 5 (Expected Shortfall)





X (q)dq, p ∈ (0,1). (6)
This risk measure, also known as Tail-(or Conditional-)Value-at-Risk, corresponds to the average
of all VaRps above the threshold p. Hence it reﬂects both the probability and the severity of a
potentialdefault. Expected shortfallhas been proposedintheliteratureas ariskmeasurecorrecting
someofthetheoreticalweaknessesofValue-at-Risk(WirchandHardy1999). Subjecttocontinuity
of FX at the threshold VaRp, Expected Shortfall coincides with the Tail Conditional Expectation,
deﬁned by
ρ(X) = E[X|X > F
−1
X (p)]. (7)




(1 − g(1 − FX(x)))dx +
Z ∞
0
g(1 − FX(x))dx, (8)
where g : [0,1]  → [0,1] is increasing and concave (Wang 1996). This risk measure can be viewed
as an expectation under a distortion of the probability distribution effected by the function g. It can
be easily shown that Expected Shortfall is a special case obtained by a bilinear distortion (Wirch
and Hardy 1999). Distortionrisk measures can be viewed as Choquet integrals (Denneberg (1990),
Denneberg (1994)), which are extensively used in the economics of uncertainty, e.g. Schmeidler
(2003). An equivalent class of risk measures deﬁned in the ﬁnance literature are known as spectral
risk measures (Acerbi 2002).







and it combines the properties of the exponential premium principle with those of distortion risk
measures.
3. PROPERTIES OF RISK MEASURES
The literature is rich in discussions of the properties of alternative risk measures, as well as the
desirability of such properties, e.g. Goovaerts et al. (1984), Artzner et al. (1999), Goovaerts et al.
(2003), Denuit et al. (2005). In view of this, the current discussion is invariably selective.
An often required property of risk measures is that of monotonicity, stating
If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ). (10)
This reﬂects the obvious requirement that losses that are always higher should also attract a higher
capital requirement.Capital allocation 7
A further appealing property is that of translation or cash invariance,
ρ(X + a) = ρ(X) + a, for a ∈ R. (11)
This postulates that adding a constant loss amount to a portfolio increases the required risk capital
by the same amount. We note that this has the implication that
ρ(X − ρ(X)) = ρ(X) − ρ(X) = 0, (12)
which, in conjunction with monotonicity, facilitates the interpretation of ρ(X) as the minimum
capital amount that has to be added to X in order to make it acceptable.
Two conceptually linked properties are the ones of positive homogeneity,
ρ(bX) = bρ(X), for b ≥ 0, (13)
and subadditivity,
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ), for all X,Y ∈ X. (14)
Positive homogeneity postulates that a linear increase in the risk exposure X also implies linear
increase in risk. Subadditivity requires that the merging of risks should always yield a reduction in
rick capital due to diversiﬁcation.
Risk measures satisfying the four properties of monotonicity, translation invariance, positive
homogeneity and subadditivity have become widely known as coherent (Artzner et al. 1999). This
particular axiomatization, also proposed in an actuarial context (Denneberg (1990), Wang et al.
(1997)), has achieved near-canonical status in the world of ﬁnancial risk management. While
Value-at-Risk generally fails the subadditivity property, due to its disregard for the extreme tails of
distributions, part of its appeal to regulators and practitioners stems of its use as an approximation
to a coherent risk measure.
Nonetheless, coherent risk measures have also attracted criticism because of their insensitivity
to the aggregation of large positively dependent risks implied by the latter two properties, e.g.
Goovaerts et al. (2003). The weaker property of convexity has been proposed in the literature
(F¨ ollmer and Schied 2002a), a property already discussed in Deprez and Gerber (1985). Convexity
requires that:
ρ(λX + (1 − λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1 − λ)ρ(Y ), for all X,Y ∈ X and λ ∈ [0,1]. (15)
Convexity, while retaining the diversiﬁcation property, relaxes the requirement that a risk measure
must be insensitive to aggregation of large risks. It is noted that subadditivity is obtained by
combining convexity with positive homogeneity. Risk measures satisfying convexity and applying
increasing penalties for large risks have been proposed in Tsanakas and Desli (2003).
Risk measures produce an ordering of risks, in the sense that ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) means that X
is considered less risky than Y . One would wish that ordering to conform to standard economic
theory, i.e. to be consistent with widely accepted notions of stochastic order such as 1st and 2nd
order stochastic dominance and convex order, see M¨ uller and Stoyan (2002), Denuit et al. (2005).
It has been shown that under some relatively mild technical conditions, risk measures that are
monotonic and convex produce such a consistent ordering of risks (B¨ auerle and M¨ uller 2006).8 A. Tsanakas
A further key property relates to the dependence structure between risks under which the risk
measure becomes additive
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ), (16)
as this implies a situation where neither diversiﬁcation credits nor aggregation penalties are as-
signed. In the context of subadditive risk measures, comonotonic additivity is a sensible require-
ment, as it postulates that no diversiﬁcation is applied in the case of comonotonicity (the maximal
level of dependence between risks, e.g. Dhaene et al. (2002)). On the other hand, one could require
a risk measure to be independent additive. If such a risk measure is also consistent with the stop-
loss or convex order, by the results of Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996), it is guaranteed to penalize
any positive dependence by being superadditive (i.e. ρ(X + Y ) ≥ ρ(X) + ρ(Y )) and reward any
negative dependence by being subadditive.
The risk measures deﬁned above satisfy the following properties:
Expected value principle Monotonic, positive homogenous, additive for all dependence struc-
tures.
Standard deviation principle Translation invariant, positive homogenous, subadditive.
Exponential premium principle Monotonic, translation invariant, convex, independent additive.
Value-at-Risk Monotonic, translation invariant, positive homogenous, subadditive for joint-ellip-
tically distributed risks (Embrechts et al. 2002), comonotonic additive.
Expected Shortfall Monotonic,translationinvariant,positivehomogenous,subadditive,comono-
tonic additive.
Distortion risk measure Monotonic, translation invariant, positivehomogenous, subadditive, co-
monotonic additive.
Distortion-exponential risk measure Monotonic, translation invariant, convex.
Finally we note that all risk measures discussed in this contribution are law invariant, meaning
that ρ(X) only depends on the distribution function of X (Wang et al. (1997), Kusuoka (2001)).
This implies that two risks characterised by the same probability distribution would be allocated
the same amount of economic capital.
4. CONSTRUCTIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF RISK MEASURES
4.1. Indifference arguments
Economic theories of choice under risk seek to model the preferences of economic agents with re-
spect to uncertain pay-offs. They generally have representations in terms of preference functionals
V : −X  → R, in the sense that
−X is preferred to − Y ⇔ V (−X) ≥ V (−Y ). (17)Capital allocation 9
(Note that the minus sign is applied because we have deﬁned risk as losses, while preference
functionals are typically applied on pay-offs.)
Then a risk measure can be deﬁned by assuming that the addition to initial wealth W of a
liability X and the corresponding capital amount ρ(X) does not affect preferences (B¨ uhlmann
1970)
V (W0 − X + ρ(X)) = V (W0). (18)
Often in this context W0 = 0 is assumed for simplicity.
The leading paradigm of choice under risk is the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), under which
V (W) = E[u(W)], (19)








, a > 0. (20)
It can be easily seen that equations (18), (19) and (20) yield the exponential premium principle
deﬁned in section 2.
An alternative theory is the dual theory of choice under risk (Yaari 1987), under which
V (W) = −
Z 0
−∞
(1 − h(1 − FW(w)))dw +
Z ∞
0
h(1 − FW(w))dw, (21)
where h : [0,1]  → [0,1] is increasing and convex. It can then be shown that the risk measure
obtained from (18) and (21) is a distortion risk measure with g(s) = 1−h(1−s). For the function
h(s) = 1 − (1 − s)
1
γ, γ > 1 (22)
the well known proportional hazards transform with g(s) = s
1
γ is obtained (Wang 1996).
More detailed discussions of risk measures resulting from alternative theories of choice under
risk and references to the associated economics literature are given in Tsanakas and Desli (2003),
Denuit et al. (2006).
It should also be noted that the construction of risk measures from economic theories of choice
must not necessarily be via indifference arguments. If a risk measure satisﬁes the convexity and
monotonicity properties, then by setting U(W) = −ρ(−W) we obtain a monotonic concave pref-
erence functional. The translation invariance property of the risk measure then makes U also
translation invariant. Hence we could consider convex risk measures as the subset of concave
preference functionals that satisfy the translation invariance property (subject to a minus sign).
Such preference functionals are sometimes called monetary utility functions, as their output can be
interpreted as being in units of money rather than of an abstract notion of satisfaction.
4.2. Axiomatic characterisations
An alternative approach to deriving risk measures is by ﬁxing a set of properties that risk measures
should satisfy and then seeking an explicit functional representation.10 A. Tsanakas
For example, coherent (i.e. monotonic, translation invariant, positive homogenous and subad-




where P is a set of probability measures. By adding the comonotonic additivity property one gets
the more speciﬁc structure of P = {P : P(A) ≤ v(A) for all sets A}, where v is a submodular
set function known as a (Choquet) capacity (Denneberg 1994). The additional property of law
invariance enables writing v(A) = g(P0(A)) where P0 is the objective probability measure and g
a concave distortion function (Wang et al. 1997). This ﬁnally yields a representation of coherent,
comonotonicadditive, law invariant risk measures as distortion risk measures. An alternativeroute
towards this representation is given by Kusuoka (2001).
The probability measures in P have been termed generalized scenarios (Artzner et al. 1999)
withrespect towhichtheworstcaseexpectedlossisconsidered. Ontheotherhand, representations
such as (23) have been derived in the context of robust statistics (Huber 1981) and decision theory,
known as the multiple-priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989).
A related representation result for convex risk measures is derived in F¨ ollmer and Schied
(2002a), while results for independent additive risk measures are given in Gerber and Goovaerts
(1981), Goovaerts et al. (2004).
4.3. Re-weighting probabilities
An intuitive construction of risk measures is by re-weighting the probability distribution of the
underlying risk
ρ(X) = E[Xζ(X)], (24)
where ζ is generally assumed to be an increasing function with E[ζ(X)] = 1 and representation
(24) could be viewed as an expectation under a change of measure. Representation (24) is particu-
larly convenient when risk measures and related functionals have to be evaluated by Monte-Carlo
simulation.
Many well-known risk measures can be obtained in this way. For example, making appropriate
assumptions on FX and g one can easily show that for distortion measures it is
ρ(X) = E[Xg
′(1 − FX(X))]. (25)











The latter representation is sometimes called a ‘mixture of Esscher principles’ and studied in more
generality in Gerber and Goovaerts (1981), Goovaerts et al. (2004).Capital allocation 11
5. CAPITAL ALLOCATION
5.1. Problem deﬁnition
Often the requirement arises that the risk capital calculated for an insurance portfolio has to be
allocated to business units. There may be several reasons for such a capital allocation exercise, the
main ones being performance measurement / management and insurance pricing.
Capital allocation is not a trivial exercise, given that in general the risk measure used to set the
aggregate capital is not additive. In other words, if one has an aggregate risk Z for the insurance










due to diversiﬁcation / aggregation issues.
The capital allocation problem then consists of ﬁnding constants d1,...,dn such that
n X
j=1
dj = ρ(Z), (29)
where the allocated capital amount di should in some way reﬂect the risk of sub-portfolio Xi.
Early papers in the actuarial literature that deal with cost allocation problems in insurance are
B¨ uhlmann (1996) and Lemaire (1984), the former taking a risk theoretical view, while the later
examining alternative allocation methods from the perspective of cooperative game theory. A
speciﬁc application of cooperative game theory to risk capital allocation, including a survey of the
relevant literature, is Denault (2001).
5.2. Marginal cost approaches
Marginal cost approaches associate allocated capital to the impact that changes in the exposure to














, (31)12 A. Tsanakas
subject to appropriate differentiability assumptions. If the risk measure is positive homogeneous,
then by Euler’s theorem we have that
n X
j=1
MC(Xj;Z) = ρ(Z) (32)
and we can hence use marginal costs directly di = MC(Xi;Z) as the capital allocation.
If the risk measure is in addition subadditive then we have that (Aubin 1981):
di = MC(Xi;Z) ≤ ρ(Xi), (33)
i.e. the allocated capital amount is always lower than the stand-alone risk capital of the sub-
portfolio. This corresponds to the game theoretical concept of the core, in that the allocation
does not provide an incentive for splitting the aggregate portfolio. This requirement is consistent
with the subadditivity property, which postulates that there is always a beneﬁt in pooling risks.
In the case that no such strong assumptions as positive homogeneity (and subadditivity) are
made with respect to the risk measure, marginal costs will in general not yield an appropriate
allocation, as they will not add up to the aggregate risk. Cooperative game theory then provides an
alternative allocation method, based on the Aumann-Shapley value (Aumann and Shapley 1974),





It can easily be seen that if we set di = AC(Xi,Z) then the dis add up to ρ(Z) and that for
positive homogenous risk measures the Aumann-Shapley allocation reduces to marginal costs.
Early applications of the Aumann-Shapley value to cost allocation problems are Billera and Heath
(1982), Mirman and Tauman (2006).
For the examples of risk measures that were introduced in section 2, the following allocations
are obtained from marginal costs / Aumann-Shapley.
Example 8 (Expected value principle)
di = λE[Xi] (35)
Example 9 (Standard deviation principle)











Example 11 (Value-at-Risk (Tasche 2004))
di = E[Xi|Z = VaRp(Z)] (38)
under suitable assumptions on the joint probability distribution of (Xi,Z).Capital allocation 13
Example 12 (Expected Shortfall (Tasche 2004))
di = E[Xi|Z > VaRp(Z)], (39)
under suitable assumptions on the joint probability distribution of (Xi,Z).
Example 13 (Distortion risk measure (Tsanakas 2004))
di = E[Xig
′(1 − FZ(Z))] (40)
assuming representation (25) is valid.








While marginal cost-based approaches are well-established in the literature, there are a number of
alternativeapproaches to capital allocation. For example, we notethat marginal costs generally de-
pend on the joint distribution of the individual sub-portfolio and the aggregate risk. In some cases
this dependence may not be desirable, for example when one tries to measure the performance of
sub-portfoliosto allocate bonuses. In that case, a simpleproportionalrepartition of costs (Lemaire






Different issues emerge when the capital allocation is to be used for managing the performance
of the aggregate portfolio, as measured by a particular metric such as return-on-capital. Assume
that ˆ Xi, i = 1,...,n correspond to the liabilities from sub-portfolio i minus reserves correspond-
ing to those liabilities, such that E[ ˆ Xi] = 0. We then have the breakdown
Xi = ˆ Xi − pi, (43)
where pi corresponds to the underwriting proﬁt from the insurer’s sub-portfolio (e.g. line of busi-
ness) i, such that
Pn
j=1 ˆ Xj = ˆ Z and
Pn
j=1 pj = p. Then we deﬁne the return on capital for the





This is discussed in depth in Tasche (2004) for the case that ρ is a coherent risk measure. It is then




, (45)14 A. Tsanakas
where di represents capital allocated to ˆ Xi, provides the right incentives for optimizing perfor-
mance. It is shown that marginal costs is the unique allocation mechanism that satisﬁes this re-
quirementas set outin that paper. A closelyrelated argument is that underthemarginal cost alloca-
tion a portfolio balanced to optimize aggregate return on capital has the property that RoC = RoCi
for all i. While this produces a useful performance yardstick that can be used throughout the com-
pany, some care has to be taken when applying marginal cost methodologies. In particular, if the
marginal capital allocation to a sub-portfolio is small e.g. for reasons of diversiﬁcation, the insurer
should be careful not to let that fact undermine underwriting standards. A proportional allocation
method could also be used for reference, to avoid that danger.
Often one may be interested in calculating capital allocations that are in some sense optimal.
For example, in Dhaene et al. (2005) capital allocations are calculated such that a suitably deﬁned
distance function between individual sub-portfolios and allocated capital levels is minimized. This
methodology reproduces many capital allocation methods found in the literature, while also con-
sidering the case that aggregate economic capital is exogenously given rather than calculated via
a risk measure. A different optimization approach to capital allocation is presented in Laeven and
Goovaerts (2003).
An alternative strand of the literature on capital allocation relates to the pricing of the policy-
holderdeﬁcit (also known as the ‘limited liabilityput option’), due to theinsurer’s potential default
(Myers and Read 2001) and considers the marginal impact of subportfolios on the market price of
the deﬁcit.
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Monte Carlo simulation is currently the method of choice for the pricing of callable derivatives
in LIBOR market models. Lately more and more papers are surfacing in which variance re-
duction methods are applied to the pricing of derivatives with early exercise features. We focus
on one of the conceptually easiest variance reduction methods, control variates. The basis of
our method is an upper bound of the callable contract in terms of plain vanilla contracts, which
is found to be a highly effective control variate. Several examples of callable LIBOR exotics
demonstrate the effectiveness and wide applicability of the method.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the seminal papers of Carri` ere (1996), Tsitsiklis and Roy (2001) and Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001) regression methods have become increasingly popular for the valuation and risk
management of derivatives with early exercise features. In particular, for high-dimensional non-
Markovian models such as the LIBOR market model (LMM), the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm
as it has become known is the method of choice. Though Monte Carlo methods are often criticised
for having slow convergence, one distinct advantage over lattice-based methods is that one can
appeal to a vast array of probabilistic methods in order to reduce the variance of the estimate of the
option price.
Since the introduction of Monte Carlo based methods in mathematical ﬁnance, variance re-
duction techniques, see e.g. J¨ ackel (2002) and Glasserman (2003) for an extensive overview, have
become commonplace when it comes to the valuation of European and path-dependent contracts.
It is only recently however that papers have surfaced in which these techniques are applied to
1Large parts of this research were carried out while the ﬁrst author was writing his Master’s thesis at the Delft
University of Technology and the Modelling and Research department of Rabobank International, and the second
author was employed by the latter department and the Tinbergen Institute at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. We
thankseminarparticipantsatRabobankInternationalandthe5thActuarialandFinancialMathematicsDayinBrussels.
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the valuation of Bermudan derivatives. Bolia et al. (2004) and Pietersz and Van Regenmortel
(2006) consider importance sampling, whereas Piterbarg (2004), Rasmussen (2005), Jensen and
Svenstrup (2005), Bolia and Juneja (2005) and Ehrlichman and Henderson (2006) have opted for
control variates.
From the numerical examples in these studies it seems that control variates allow for larger
orders of magnitude of variance reduction, though speciﬁc payoffs such as TARNs are well suited
for importance sampling, see Pietersz and Van Regenmortel (2006). Piterbarg (2004) was among
theﬁrst to suggest usingcontrol variates forthe valuationof Bermudan derivativesin theLMM. By
constructing an analytically tractable Markovian approximation to the LMM it should be possible
to value the Bermudan payoff in a lattice and use this as a control variate. This has the advantage
that the approach is virtually payoff-independent, the only task left is to construct an approximate
model that is highly correlated with the original model.
Otherattemptsto usecontrol variates havemainlybeen targeted at usingcontrol variates within
the original model. Within these papers we can recognise two different types of approaches. On
the one hand, Rasmussen (2005) and Jensen and Svenstrup (2005) have opted for using plain
vanilla options as control variates, whereas both Bolia and Juneja (2005) and Ehrlichman and
Henderson (2006) try to approximate that martingale that renders the additive upper bound of
Rogers (2002), Haugh and Kogan (2004) and Andersen and Broadie (2004) equal to the true
value of the Bermudan option. Our approach builds on an observation by Jensen and Svenstrup
(2005), who noticed that one of the most effective control variates for a Bermudan swaption is
simply a cap. First and foremost we aim to provide an intuitive explanation for the effectivity of
such simple control variates, and to investigate how they can be improved upon. Second, of the
above papers only Jensen and Svenstrup have applied control variates to the pricing of Bermudan
interest rate derivatives, and have only considered the easiest example – the Bermudan swaption.
The method we consider will be applicable to all kinds of callable LIBOR exotics (CLEs), a term
coined by Piterbarg (2004).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some terminology and describes the
LMM and CLEs we consider later on. Section 3 reproduces the results that have been reported
by Jensen and Svenstrup and analyses why an upper bound on the CLE is a very effective control
variate. Section 4 describes how we can easily construct an upper bound for most CLEs and gives
two speciﬁc examples of this for a callable inverse ﬂoater and a snowball. Possible improvements
of this idea are also discussed. Finally, section 5 demonstrates the effectiveness of our method and
concludes.
2. LIBOR MARKET MODEL AND CALLABLE LIBOR EXOTICS
We start by introducing a tenor structure T = {Ti : i = 0,...,N + 1} with daycount fractions over









where P (t,Ti) denotes the time-t price of a zero-coupon bond maturing at Ti. We use the conven-
tion that the ith LIBOR sets at Ti and is paid at Ti+1. Our numerical results have been generatedControl Variates For Callable Libor Exotics 23
in the lognormal LIBOR market model in the spot-LIBOR measure. The dynamics of Li(t) for
0 ≤ t ≤ Ti in this setup are given by:
dLi(t) = µi(t,L(t))Li(t)dt + σi(t)Li(t)dWi(t) (1)







where σi is the volatility of Li, ρij is the instantaneous correlation between Li and Lj and W1
through WN are independent Brownian motions. Finally, m(t) = {k | Tk−1 ≤ t ≤ Tk}. In the









We use the drift approximation of Hunter et al. (2001) to approximate the drift in (1).
Within this model we will be concerned with the valuation of callable or cancellable LIBOR
exotics (CLEs). Let us ﬁrst consider a structured swap, where at a subset2 Tpay of T one ex-
changes structured coupon payments with ﬂoating payments. In particular, for a payer3 swap the
net cashﬂow payment at Ti+1 is:
αi (Fi − Ci). (2)
The holder of a receiver swap obviously receives the opposite payments. In our examples the
ﬂoating rate Fi will be the LIBOR Li(Ti), though in principle this could be any rate which is
known at the payment date Ti+1. The most common example for the coupon Ci is Ci = K, which
amounts to a plain vanilla swap. Other examples we will use are an inverse ﬂoater coupon:
Ci = min(max(K − Li(Ti),f),c), (3)
where f indicates a ﬂoor and c indicates a cap, and a snowball coupon:
Ci = min(max(Ci−1 + K − Li(Ti),f),c). (4)
The snowball coupon is similar to the inverse ﬂoater, the difference being its path-dependency. In
all examples we set c = ∞.
A callable version of this swap, or a callable LIBOR exotic, is a Bermudan option to enter
into the structured swap at a prespeciﬁed set of exercise dates Tcall ⊆ T. Similarly, a cancellable
LIBOR exotic gives the right to cancel the swap at a certain set of dates. A parity relationship
between callable and cancellable swaps is:
Callable payer swap = Cancellable receiver swap + payer swap. (5)
When considering options we assume the option holder has the right to call or cancel. If however
the option seller has the right to call or cancel, the value to the option holder is exactly the opposite
of the value to the option seller. Valuing cancellable options is therefore as easy or difﬁcult as
valuing callable options. In the remainder of the paper we use the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm,
see Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), to value the CLEs.
2In full generality both legs of the swap can have a different frequency and daycount conventions. For ease of
exposure we neglect this here.
3Analogous to vanilla swaps, a payer swap indicates that we are paying the structured coupon.24 J. Buitelaar and R. Lord
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Thevalueofa callablepayer swap, where theholderoftheswap has theright to call, can be written
as an optimal stopping problem:










Adding a control variate to (6) which is also evaluated at the optimal stopping time t yields:






αi (Fi − Ci)
B(Ti+1)
− β
T (X(τ) − E0 [X(τ)])
#
(7)
where X(t) represents a vector of time-t measurable products whose analytical expectation can be
evaluated relatively easily. The optional sampling theorem states that the value of (7) is the same
as that of (6). In principle we could evaluate the control variate at any other time. Rasmussen
(2005) has shown however that it is never optimal to sample the control variate after the optimal
exercise date. Though it is not easy to prove that it is never optimal to sample prior to this date, it
seems reasonable that the optimal stopping time is also the optimal sampling time of the control











the variance of (7) is minimised. We will estimate the variance and covariances in this equation by
the sample (co)variances in the same simulation. The bias this introduces can be expected to be
negligible, see J¨ ackel (2002).
In this section we will reproduce the results from Jensen and Svenstrup, who found that a cap
is a highly effective control variate for a Bermudan swaption. We will try to explain why this is the
case. The parameters and settings we use are the ones used by Bender et al. (2005). Tenor dates
are chosen as Ti = 0.5i, i = 0,...,12 (= N + 1). Daycount fractions are assumed to be constant
















for 2 ≤ i,j ≤ N. Values of the parameters in (8) and (9), as well as the initial forward LIBORs
are supplied in Table 1. The initial forward term structure is upward sloping, which more often
than not seems to be the case in interest rate markets.Control Variates For Callable Libor Exotics 25
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Li(0) 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 2.7% 3.1% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.8%
Φi − 15.3% 14.3% 14.0% 14.0% 13.9% 13.8% 13.7% 13.6% 13.5% 13.4% 13.2%
a b c d ρ∞
0.976 2.00 1.500 0.500 0.663
Table 1: Intital forward LIBORs, volatility and correlation parameters
The chosen example in this section is a T12 no-call T1 Bermudan swaption, which allows us
to enter into a swap maturing at T12 at dates T1 through T11. In the notation of (2) this implies
that the ﬂoating rate Fi = Li(Ti) and Ci = K. We will look at an at-the-money (ATM) example,
an in-the-money (ITM) and an out-of-the-money (OTM) example. The ﬁxed rates K of these
Bermudan swaptions as well as their values are supplied in Table 2. The values in Table 2 have
been generated with 100000 paths. The regressions in the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm were
precomputed in 50000 independent paths.
Payer Receiver
K Value Se K Value Se
OTM 2.22% 100.6 0.57 4.22% 15.64 0.13
ATM 3.22% 224.2 0.77 3.22% 139.3 0.44
ITM 4.22% 514.1 0.76 2.22% 508.0 0.68
Table 2: Bermudan swaption values and standard errors (in bp)
Let us deﬁne the variance reduction ratio by κ = se2/se2
CV. Variance reduction is obviously
not all we are interested in — if we have found a way to reduce the variance of our price estimate
by a factor of 2, but the Monte Carlo simulation including the control variates takes twice as long
as the original simulation, the method is not very useful. We take into account the increase in









The scaling by the ratio of τ to τCV, the times required for the simulation without and with control
variates, accounts for the fact that the computational time required and the inverse of the variance
of the price estimate scale roughly linearly with the number of paths. Hence, when e.g. θ = 2 we
can obtain the same standard error with control variates in half the time compared to the situation
without control variates. In practice we noted that the additional time required to value the control
variates within the simulation is minor compared to the total simulation time. The reason for this
is that the lion’s share of computation time is spent in the construction of the paths. One ﬁnal note
must be made on the computation of θ: here we have neglected the cost of estimating the exercise









































Figure 2: θ for several control variates in OTM/ATM/ITM payer (A) and receiver (B) Bermudan
swaption
In Figure 1 we have depicted the variance reduction factor κ and θ, which corrects for the
additional computational time that is required, when using several plain vanilla products as control
variates for the ATM Bermudan payer swaption from Table 2. The swaptions in Figure 1 are the
European swaptions4 which are embedded in the Bermudan. The reason why only the T6-swaption
is included is that this was found to be the best-performing European swaption.
Even though using a swap or a European swaption shows signiﬁcant improvements (up to
a θ of 15 for the best-performing European swaption), these single control variates are by far
outperformed by the cap. The correlation between the cap and the Bermudan is 0.998, i.e. they
are almost perfectly correlated. As Jensen and Svenstrup already noted, using a cap alone leads
to a higher variance reduction than the best linear combination of all European swaptions which
are embedded in the Bermudan swaption. Lifting the restriction on the weights of the caplets (i.e.
using a vector of caplets instead of a cap as control variate) does not give large improvements
— when investigating the optimal weights of each caplet we noted they were quite close to 1,
indicating that the cap is close to optimal. Adding a swap to the cap seems to give the best results,
with a 30% improvement compared to the cap alone.
Figure 2 ﬁnally shows θ for all options from 2, when a cap — or a ﬂoor for the receiver
Bermudan — is used as the control variate. As expected, the more ITM the option is, the higher
4Theoretically speaking the exact price of a European swaption is not known in closed-form in the LMM. Several
highly accurate approximations do exist however, so that the bias induced hereby is negligible.Control Variates For Callable Libor Exotics 27
θ will be as the payoff of the cap or ﬂoor will be very highly correlated with the payoff of the
underlying swap once we have decided to enter into it. The magnitude of θ is clearly smaller for
the receiver Bermudan. What is causing this is actually the same thing that is allowing the cap to
work so well: the upward sloping term structure.
The reason why the cap works so well is the following. Once we have decided to enter into
the swap, the payments from the swap exactly match the payments of the cap, provided that the
ﬂoating payment is higher than the ﬁxed. On the optimal exercise moment this is clearly the case.
The upward sloping term structure ensures that, on average, the future net exchanges of the payer
swap will be positive, so that thevalue of thecap and theswap will be highly correlated. The initial
payments of the cap that occur prior to the exercise date will lower the correlation. However, the
contribution of these payments to the cap will most likely be low, as otherwise it is likely that it
would have been optimal to exercise into the swap at an earlier date. For the receiver swaption
the upward sloping term structure works in exactly the opposite way. After we have decided to
exercise, the net value of future payments is expected to be lower than the ﬁrst payment exchange.
As a consequence the probability of negative cash ﬂows increases, leading to a lower correlation
of the ﬂoor and the structured swap we have exercised into.
Upon inspecting Figure 1 it may seem counterintuitive that the cap works so much better than
a single or all embedded European swaptions. A partial explanation for this is that in the extremes
(high or low interest rates), the cap perfectly mimics the payoff of the Bermudan swaption. Only
the European swaption which has the same start date as the Bermudan shares this property with
the cap. An afﬁne combination of control variates will not satisfy this property, which explains
what we see in Figure 1.
Even though the swap rate is the main driver behind the exercise decision, a control variate
that mimics the payoff of the Bermudan swaption in the extremes will be a highly effective control
variate. We further explore this idea for more general CLEs in the next section.
4. EFFECTIVE CONTROL VARIATES FOR CLES
Supported by the results from the previous section, this section will initially focus on generalising
the method from the previous section to more general payoffs. In Section 4.2 we try to improve
upon this methodology.
4.1. Mimicking the cap
In Section 3 we noted that the cap was a very effective control variate for the Bermudan payer
swaption. Observe that the cap is constructed from the underlying swap by taking each forward
rate agreement (FRA) and ﬂooring it at zero. This approach is easily extended to other CLEs.
The only condition that the payoff has to satisfy is that each ﬂoored swaplet can be valued, or at
least approximated, in closed-form. We will apply this approach to the two CLEs we presented
in Section 2, the inverse ﬂoater and the snowball. In the remainder of this text we will refer to a
ﬂoored swaplet as a “caplet”, and to the sum of all ﬂoored swaplets as a “cap”.28 J. Buitelaar and R. Lord
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The ﬂoored inverse ﬂoater coupon is a linear combination of caplets, which can be valued analyti-
cally. Hence we can use it as a control variate.
If we consider the payoff of a payer snowball (see (4) for the coupon), it is clear that the under-
lying swap is the same as that of the inverse ﬂoater, with the exception that the strike K has now
been replaced by a path-dependent value Ci−1+K. The easiest way to ensure that the “caplet” can
be valued analytically is to replace the path-dependent strike by a constant value, e.g. by assuming
that the forward term structure will be realised. Hereafter we can follow the same procedure as
for the inverse ﬂoater. Alternatively, one could consider a dynamic self-ﬁnancing strategy where
at several points in time during the simulation we update the strikes using all information known
at that time. The main drawback hereof is the strong increase in the required computational time.
Initial tests of such strategies showed that theincrease in computationaltime required does not out-
weigh the decrease in variance, so that we omit these results here. Similar ﬁndings were reported
in Jensen and Svenstrup (2005), where an approximate delta hedge of a Bermudan swaption was
considered as a control variate.
4.2. Using multiple control variates
Even though the results in the section 3 were quite impressive, there must be better control variates
than the “cap” alone. We can try to improve the variance reduction by altering the strike of the
“cap”, or even of the individual “caplets”. This is indeed conﬁrmed by our investigations, which
are not reported here. For the Bermudan swaption, merely changing the strike of the cap/ﬂoor
increased the factor θ by approximately a factor of 2. In the case of the ATM Bermudan receiver
swaption the optimal strike was even as far away as 75 bp from the original strike.
The question is how to determine the strikes that yield the highest correlation with the CLE. In
principleone could cache a small number of paths on which we minimisethe variance with respect
to the free parameters. Subsequently we would generate a larger independent set of paths which
we then use to value the Bermudan.
Here we opt for a more pragmatic approach. Focusing on the Bermudan swaption, it is not
hard to see that a linear combination of caplets with different strikes can approximate the payoff of
a caplet with an unknown strike. In order to enable strikes to vary per maturity, we split the total
“cap” into smaller “caps” with different strikes and different caplet maturities. The total amount
of control variates must be large enough to have enough ﬂexibility to approximate the unknown
optimal control variate, yet small enough to avoid multicollinearity between the control variates.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section we ﬁrst investigate whether the general strategy outlined in Section 4.1 yields a
satisfactory variance reduction for callable inverse ﬂoaters and cancellable snowballs. Second, weControl Variates For Callable Libor Exotics 29
investigate whether varying the strike of the suggested control variates is effective, as detailed in
Section 4.2.
The exercise or cancellation dates of both products will be the same as that of the Bermudan
swaption from Section 3, i.e. we can call or cancel on dates T1 through T11. Similarly, the cash
ﬂow dates are T2 through T12. For the callable inverse ﬂoater we use K = 6.22% and f = 2%,
which ensures that the value of the underlying structured swap is almost zero. For the cancellable
snowball we take C1 = 1.35% and K = 3.1%. We only consider ATM products in this section,
the contract parameters of the inverse ﬂoater and the snowball are chosen such that the underlying
swap is roughly ATM.
Bermudan swaption Callable inverse ﬂoater Cancellable snowball
Payer Receiver Payer Receiver Payer Receiver
Swap 6.7 2.1 5.9 2.7 n/a n/a
“Cap”5 190.4 8.9 109.8 9.7 7.9 18.8
3 “caps” 370.6 20.3 176.0 23.5 14.3 22.9
3×3 “subcaps” 520.3 62.0 337.8 63.8 26.1 40.5
11×3 “subcaps” 456.0 54.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Table 3: θ for various control variates applied to ATM CLEs
Table 3 shows the variance reduction ratio θ we found when using various control variates. The
row labelled “swap” reports the results found by using the underlying structured swap as a control
variate. The swap underlying the cancellable snowball cannot easily be valued analytically, so
that we omit this result from the table. The row labelled “cap” generalises the strategy for the
Bermudan swaption to the other CLEs, as outlined in Section 4.1. For the callable inverse ﬂoater
this clearly leads to a highly effective control variates for the payer case. This conﬁrms our idea
that an upper bound of the underlying LIBOR exotic is a highly effective control variate.
For the snowball contract, the magnitude of θ is still quite signiﬁcant, though not as large
as for the other contracts. This is caused by the path-dependency of the snowball coupon. As
mentioned earlier, we replaced the previous coupon in (4) by a constant which was calculated by
assuming the forward term structure would be realised. Finally, it may seem odd to the reader that
the cancellable receiver snowball has a higher θ than the payer contract. This is however caused
by the parity relation mentioned in (5).
To investigate whether the suggestions from Section 4.2 are effective, we considered three
strategies:
• Use three “caps”, where the strikes are equal to K, K − 1% and K + 1%;
• Split each “cap” intothree smaller“subcaps”, theﬁrst spanning[T1,T3], thesecond spanning
[T4,T7] and the last spanning [T8,T11]; as control variates we use each of these “subcaps”
with strikes equal to K, K − 1% and K + 1%;
• Split the“cap” into 11 “caplets”, and use each of these as a control variates with strikes equal
to K, K − 1% and K + 1%. This leads to a total of 33 control variates.
5To be precise, by cap we here mean the payoff which is found by summing all swaplets, ﬂoored at zero.30 J. Buitelaar and R. Lord
For all CLEs we see that replacing the original cap by a vector of caps gives signiﬁcantly better
results. In this way we manage to get high variance reductions for both the payer and the receiver
contracts. Note that the θ found when using a vector of “subcaps” is higher compared to using all
“caplets” with three different strikes. The reason for this is that the marginal increase in variance
reduction is offset by the increase in computation time. We have therefore only reported these
results for the Bermudan swaption, and omitted them for the other CLEs.
Concluding, in this paper we have investigated the result noted by Jensen and Svenstrup that
a cap is a highly effective control variate when valuing a Bermudan payer swaption. We have
demonstrated how to generalise this idea to more general CLEs by constructing an upper bound
for the CLE, and using this as a control variate. This can lead to a large variance reduction, as
demonstrated in our numerical results. Benchmarking this method to other control variates, such
as the techniques of Bolia and Juneja (2005) and Ehrlichman and Henderson (2006) will be part
of further research.
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Abstract
We study a stochastic model for a market with two tradeable assets where the price of the ﬁrst
asset is implied by the value of the second one and the state of a partially ‘hidden’ control
process. We derive a closed expression for the value of the ﬁrst asset, as a function of the price
for the second and the most recent observation of the control process. We show how the model
can be applied to EU markets for carbon emissions.
1. INTRODUCTION TO EU CARBON EMISSIONS MARKETS
The European Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) in June
2000with theobjectiveto identify, developand implementtheessentialelements ofan EU strategy
to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change assigns mandatory targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
to signatory nations. Carbon dioxide, a by-product of the combustion of fossil fuels, is the most
widely known type of greenhouse gas. All 25 EU countries simultaneously ratiﬁed the Kyoto
Protocol on 31 May 2002.
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a signiﬁcant part of the ECCP
and is currently the largest emissions trading scheme in the world. To participate in the EU ETS,
members states must ﬁrst submit a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for approval to the European
Commission. Selected carbon intensive installations such as steel manufacturers, power stations
of above 20 MW capacity, cement mills, etc. receive free emission credits under the terms of this
NAP, enabling them to emit greenhouse gases up to the assigned tonnage.
Installations can bilaterally trade emission certiﬁcates under the EU ETS, in order to offset any
excess or shortage of carbon emission credits above NAP limits. About 12000 installations within
the Union are covered by the EU ETS in a ﬁrst phase (2005-2007), representing almost 50% of
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total carbon emissions. The EU ETS enables selected industries to reduce carbon emissions in
a cost effective manner, i.e. installations can opt for either reducing actual carbon emissions or
buying additional permits, for instance in case upgrading of the installation would turn out too
expensive. The NAP only imposes a cap on the total actual carbon emissions per member state.
Actual trading with EU ETS emission allowances commenced on January 1st, 2005. By the
end of the same year, almost 400 milliontonnes of carbon equivalenthad been traded, representing
a turnover in excess of EUR 7 billion. First phase EU ETS carbon credits reached prices of EUR
30 per tonne at the high ending April 2006. Prices for ﬁrst phase carbon credits then plummeted
to below EUR 10 per tonne in a few days beginning May 2006 after EU ﬁgures on actual 2005
emission levels suggested emission caps to selected industries had been too generous to have a
signiﬁcant impact. Emission caps for the second phase (2008-2012) are currently under review
because of the apparent overdimensioning of NAP levels in the ﬁrst phase. Further reduction in
NAP levels is a likely alternative as well as the inclusion of additional industry sectors such as
aviation and transport or still other harmful greenhouse gas emissions like methane.
Selected industries included in the EU ETS can opt to postpone procurement of Phase I emis-
sion allowances until Phase II, provided a ﬁne of EUR 40 per tonne is paid at the end of Phase I.
This rule actually constitutes a mechanism whereby prices for Phase I and Phase II emission cred-
its become linked in case actual Phase I emissions exceed NAP levels. Prices for Phase I contracts
at the end of the ﬁrst phase will be nonzero only if the EU zone is net short EU ETS carbon credits
for this phase. Industries can then opt for borrowing their short ETS position into the next phase at
a ﬁxed cost of EUR 40 per tonne.
A net short position in the ETS trading zone thus imposes an identity on prices for Phase I
and Phase II emission allowances. In theory, Phase I prices must in that case be equal to Phase II
prices plus EUR 40 per tonne. If actual emissions turn out lower than NAP levels, Phase I credits
will be worthless at the end of Phase I and the relation with Phase II prices breaks down. Clearly,
Phase I emission allowances can be regarded as a derivativewith Phase II credits as an underlying,
contingent on the net position of the EU ETS zone at the end of 2007. The ‘net position of the
zone’ is a variable that cannot be directly observed in the market and hence constitutes a source of
non-traded risk that renders the market incomplete.
The present note presents a mathematical model for incomplete markets that can be applied
to the context of the EU ETS. We depart from a diffusion model for Phase II prices to which we
add an auxiliary process that models the net position of the EU ETS zone on carbon emission
allowances. The price of Phase I contracts is conditional on the value of Phase II allowances and
the sign of the auxiliary process. Experiences with price behaviour of carbon emission allowances
at ending April 2006 has illustrated that the sign, rather than the absolute value of the EU ETS
short position can already have a dramatic impact on prices for carbon credits in Phase I. The latter
observation suggests a link between Phase I prices and the sign of the short position.
The remainder ofthis paper is as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy summarize themean-variance
approach to the pricing and hedging of contingent claims. We describe a mathematical model in
Section 3 for a more general incomplete market and we address the risk neutral pricing of a claim
whose value depends on the status of an assumed ‘hidden’ variable. This model is applied to the
EU ETS in Section 4 where the price for the Phase I contract price arises, becomes a derivative
deﬁned in terms of the auxiliary variable modelling the net position of the EU ETS zone and the
Phase II contract price. The price of the Phase I contract takes a canonical form involving the
probability of the EU ETS zone being short at the end of Phase I in 2007. Finally, we derive anHedging under incomplete information: Applications to emissions markets 35
analytical expression for the Laplace transform of this probability density function, a calculation
involving speciﬁc properties of an Azema type martingale.
We investigate mathematical properties of this probability density function in Section 4. The
results of a number of numerical surveys to the inﬂuence of the various parameters are discussed
and we present evidence for applicability of the model to actual carbon market data. We ﬁnish
formulating some conclusions and directives for further research.
2. PRICING AND HEDGING IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS
The issue of pricing and hedging when the market is incomplete is a fairly well studied concept
in mathematical ﬁnance. As one cannot talk about a single price when the market is no longer
complete, there are different methodologieswith differing characteristics. One of the most popular
methods is to price and hedge using a quadratic risk-minimization criterion. For a short explana-
tion of this approach consider the following example. Let S denote the discounted price process
of the risky asset, which is a continuous semimartingale deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space
(Ω,F,(Ft)0≤t≤T,P) satisfying usual assumptions. Let ξ denote the number of holdings in the
risky asset and ν denote the number of holdings in the bond, whose price is normalized to 1. Then
the value of the portfolio at time t would be given by Vt = ξtSt + νt. Let Ct := Vt −
R t
0 ξsdSs.
C is the cost process associated with the trading strategy and would be a constant process if the
trading strategy were self-ﬁnancing. Let H be a contingent claim. In a complete market setting
we would be able to ﬁnd a pair (ξ,ν) such that VT = H and that C were a constant process, i.e.
H = C +
R T
0 ξsdSs. However, in an incomplete market C would not necessarily be constant since
it is typically not possible to ﬁnd a self-ﬁnancing replicating strategy. This means one needs to
ﬁnd an optimalitycriterion to decide on the hedging strategy to be employed. The optimal hedging
strategy in this context is deﬁned to be the one that minimizes the remaining quadratic risk at each
time t, i.e. E[(CT −Ct)2] → min. It is shown by several authors (see, e.g., F¨ ollmer and Schweizer
(1991), F¨ ollmer and Sondermann (1986), Monat and Stricker (1995) and Schweizer (1991)), un-
der different assumptions that, if one chooses this optimality criterion, the price of the contingent
claim is given by
Xt = E
∗[H|Ft],
where E∗ corresponds to the expectation operator under the so-called minimal martingale mea-
sure. The minimal martingale measure, P∗ is an equivalent probability measure under which S
is a martingale such that any martingale which was orthogonal to M remains a martingale under
P∗ where M is the martingale part in the canonical decomposition of S. Moreover, the optimal





where Vt = E∗[H|Ft]. This pricing and hedging methodology is clearly robust under equivalent
measure change. We refer the reader to Schweizer (1991), F¨ ollmer and Schweizer (1991), and
Monat and Stricker (1995) for further details on the minimal martingale measure and its usage in
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In the problem that will be analyzed in the next section, the incompleteness arise not only from
the fact that there are not enough traded securities to span all the uncertainty in the market but also
from the incomplete information. Mathematically speaking, this means the market’s information
is modelled by the ﬁltration (Gt)0≤t≤T such that Gt ⊂ Ft for every t where the inclusion is strict.
Under this restriction one could deﬁne the price of the contingent claim to be
Pt = E
∗[H|Gt].
Note that this is the optimal projection of the process X into the ﬁltration (Gt)0≤t≤T so that the
distance between the F-price, X, and G-price, P, is minimized, again, in a quadratic sense. This
is the pricing methodology that we will use in the next section.
3. AN INCOMPLETE MARKET MODEL
We consider a market modelled on a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft)0≤t≤T,P) where one of
the traded assets St : 0 ≤ t ≤ T follows a dynamics of the Merton type:
dSt = St(µdt + σdWt); St=0 = S0. (1)
Denote FW
t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T as the natural ﬁltration for the Wiener process Wt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i.e.
FW
t = σ(Ws : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
The market is featured of a control process θt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T, described by a Brownian Motion,
i.e. we have
dθt = d ˜ Wt; θt=0 = θ0. (2)
where ˜ Wt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T is another Wiener process, independent of Wt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T. This SDE
has the obvious solution θt = θ0 + ˜ Wt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T. To ease the exposition of the results we
suppose θ0 = 0, but our result can be easily generalized to the setting where θ0 is any real number.
Deﬁne Gt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T as the ﬁltration obtained by augmenting the ﬁltration (FW
t ) by the ﬁltration
generated by the signs of θ, i.e Gt = FW
t ∨ σ(sign(θu) : 0 ≤ u ≤ t). The function x → sign(x) is
deﬁned as sign(x) = 1 if x > 0 and sign(x) = −1 in case x ≤ 0.
The market trades a contingent claim at price S0







f(ST) if θT ≤ 0
0 if θT > 0
(3)
where x → f(x) is bounded real function. The value of the derivative thus depends on the sign
of the control process θT at expiry. Our goal is to derive the derivative price S0
t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
conditioned on the information available from the asset price history St : 0 ≤ t ≤ T and the sign
history sign(θt) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T of the control process θt.
To proceed with this calculation, ﬁrst note that the dynamics (1) for St under the minimal
martingale measure P∗ becomes a martingale1 with the dynamics
dSt = Stσ dW
∗
t ; St=0 = S0. (4)
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where W ∗
t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T is a Wiener process under P∗.
The assumption that ˜ Wt is independent from Wt implies that S and ˜ W are orthogonal martin-
gales with respect to the ﬁltration G under P∗ by the deﬁnition of the minimal martingale measure.

















∗[f(ST)I(θT ≤ 0) | Gt]
= E
∗[f(ST) | Gt]E
∗[I(θT ≤ 0) | Gt]
= E
∗[f(ST) | Gt]P
∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt].
The remaining task is thus to compute the probability P∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt]. The ﬁltration Gt appearing
in this expression is of a peculiar type, as it involves both the σ-algebra FW
t generated by the price
process, S, and the σ-algebra σ(sign(θu) : 0 ≤ u ≤ t). Direct computation of this parameter
seems a difﬁcult task, and we turn to the Laplace transform of θT = WT conditioned on Gt which
we write L(θT). We have
L(θT)(λ) = E
∗[exp(λθT) | Gt] (6)





∗[exp(λ ˜ WT) | Gt]
= E




















We thus need to focus on the computation of E∗[exp(λ ˜ Wt) | Gt] only and this conditioning on Gt
is generally referred to as the Azema martingale. We rewrite
E
∗[exp(λ ˜ Wt) | Gt] = E
∗[exp(λ| ˜ Wt|sign( ˜ Wt)) | Gt].
Now deﬁne gt = sup{s < t : ˜ Ws = 0}, i.e. gt is the last instant preceding time t where the Wiener
process ˜ Wt passed through the origin. Clearly, gt is measurable with respect to Gt and it is known
that Mu := |Wu|/
√
u − gu obeys the law
√
2Z for Z exponentially distributed with unit parameter
(see Revuz and Yor (1994)). We now use this result to calculate (6). Observe that
E
∗[exp(λ ˜ Wt) | Gt] = E
∗[exp(λMt sign( ˜ Wt)
√
t − gt) | Gt].
This conditional expectation can now be computed, as the law of Mt is known. Let the Gt-
measurable random variable At be deﬁned as At = λsign( ˜ Wt)
√
t − gt, then note that
E
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and we make the substitution u :=
√
2x to arrive at
E

























and upon substituting y := u − At, we ﬁnally arrive at
E






































for At = λsign( ˜ Wt)
√
t − gt. To summarize, we intend to compute the probability P∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt]
entering (5) via the Laplace transform of θT. We only need to invert the Laplace transform in (9)
to ﬁnd the distribution of θT given Gt. By integrating this law over the negative half-plane, the
desired probability P∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt] results.
4. APPLICATION TO EU CARBON EMISSIONS MARKETS
The theory out of the previous section is directly applicable to EU carbon emissions markets intro-
duced in Section 1. The traded asset St : 0 ≤ t ≤ T in (1) describes theprice process for the Phase
II emission allowances within the EU ETS in EUR per tonne. The control process θt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T
in (2) is interpreted as the net position of the entire EU ETS zone in tonne, relative to NAP lev-
els for all member states added together. Positive values for θt indicate that an excess amount of
emission certiﬁcates is available within the EU ETS perimeter at time t. Alternatively, negative θt
values are associated to a net short situation in the EU ETS scheme at time t.
The ﬁltration Gt is the version of the natural ﬁltration FW
t for the price process St : 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
augmented with the information contained in the sign of the net EU ETS position sign(θt) at time
t. I.e, Gt onlycontainsextrainformationon thenet positionon EUETScertiﬁcates withinthezone,
long or short, regardless of the magnitude of the respective excess or shortage. Recent events have
indicated that price dynamicswithin theETS framework are highlysensitiveto market information
on just this net position, and the dramatic price-collapse of Phase I emission certiﬁcates serves as aHedging under incomplete information: Applications to emissions markets 39
direct example. In reality, one will observe the state of the control prices, noteworthy its sign, any
time when the EU releases information on the realized carbon emissions or alternatively through
estimates provided by selected data providers in the EU carbon market, see PointCarbon (2006)
for instance.
The contingent claim S0
t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T mimics the price of the Phase I contract and the speciﬁc
choice f(x) = x + k reﬂects the regulatory condition that short positions in Phase I allowances
can be banked into Phase II at the price of k = 40 EUR per tonne as explained in Section 1. The
deﬁnition for the Phase I payoff in (3) beautifully expresses the true nature of the Phase I contract
as a derivative on Phase II prices, conditional on the net position at the end of the ﬁrst phase, here






∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt] (10)
expresses the value of the Phase I contract in terms of the function f and the probability that the
ETS zone will end up short on carbon emission allowances at the end of the ﬁrst phase t = T.
After making use of the martingale property for St : 0 ≤ t ≤ T under P∗ and the explicit choice
for f, we obtain
S
0
t = (St + k)P
∗[θT ≤ 0 | Gt].
Note that the probability of the ETS zone ending up short, appearing in the right hand side of (10),
can now be expressed as the fraction of Phase I EUA prices divided by the sum of Phase II prices
and the penalty of k = 40 EUR per tonne, i.e.
Rt := P





The fraction Rt is a known ratio in carbon markets, also referred to as the ‘Parson’s’ ratio Pow-
ernextCarbon (2006) and it naturally arises in the present model setting.
We ﬁnish by investigating the predictions of the present model for the probability for short
position in the ETS zone at the end of Phase I. The Laplace transform (9) can be inverted to yield
the conditional probability density for θT. Integrating this density over the negative reals results in
the desired quantity. Standard inverting of the Laplace transform gives
Rt = P









This integral can be calculated by numerical methods, resulting in model predictions for theParson
ratio Rt.
We have set T = 1 without loss of generality, while t takes values in [0,T] at the same time
when gt satisﬁes the inequality 0 ≤ gt ≤ t. The next table states selected values for Rt for different
values of t and gt given that the sign of the current position is positive. The t values in the table
varies from 0.1 to 0.7, while gt changes from 0.0 until the t value. Values for Rt were computed
using Mathematica. The table indicates a 36% probability of the zone ending up short for t = 0.1
and gt = 0.0. This probability steadily decreases for larger t values while gt is kept constant.
This is an immediate consequence of the choice we made for the control process: Since a Wiener
process is continuous as t approaches T with gt ﬁxed, sign(Wt) converges to sign(WT). Values
for Rt for t > 0.7 are more difﬁcult to obtain due to accuracy problems arising in the calculation
of (11).40 U. Cetin and M. Verschuere
Rt(+) gt
t 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 .34 .50
0.2 .28 .33 .50
0.3 .23 .26 .32 .50
0.4 .18 .21 .25 .31 .50
0.5 .15 .17 .19 .23 .29 .50
0.6 .11 .13 .15 .17 .21 .28 .50
0.7 .08 .09 .10 .12 .15 .18 .25 .50
We have repeated our numerical analysis of the ratio (11) for negative current position and the
corresponding table is marked by (−). The conventions are similar as before and results of this
effort are summarized in the next table. We note that Rt values now reﬂect the obvious fact that it
is more likely for the zone ending up short if the most recent observation of the control process θt
pointed in the same direction. Values for the ratio Rt are once more directly implied by the choice
for the control as a Wiener process. The table below expresses the fact that the lesser the remaining
time in Phase I deﬁned by T −t, the less likely the net position of the ETS zone is going to change
still. The large values for Rt for t = 0.7 are a direct consequence of this.
Rt(-) gt
t 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 .66 .50
0.2 .72 .67 .50
0.3 .77 .74 .68 .50
0.4 .82 .79 .75 .69 .50
0.5 .85 .83 .81 .77 .71 .50
0.6 .89 .87 .85 .83 .79 .72 .50
0.7 .92 .91 .90 .88 .85 .82 .75 .50
The attentive reader will note from the above tables that respective probabilities for sign(θt) = ±1
add up to one. This is an immediate consequence of a symmetry present in the Laplace transform
of the probability density in (9) as function of the sign of the control process at time t. Characteri-
zation of this symmetry is left as an exercise, but eventually boils down to the symmetric nature of
marginal distributions for the Wiener process taken as θt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We studied a model for an incomplete market with two traded assets. The ﬁrst asset arises as a
derivative on the second and is conditional on the sign of an exogenous control process. The price
of the second asset is assumed of the Merton type, while the control process is described by an
independent Wiener process. We derive an expression for the price of the ﬁrst asset under the
martingale measure minimizing the quadratic risk induced by the control process. This requires
computation of the minimal martingale measure for the prices process of the second asset.Hedging under incomplete information: Applications to emissions markets 41
We have shown how our model can be applied to recently established markets for carbon emis-
sion allowances and calculated the price for a Phase I contract in terms of the probability of the
ETS zone being short at the end of Phase I in December 2007. The probability of for Phase I ETS
is referred to as the Parson ratio in most literature and it naturally arises in our model setting.
The price for Phase I emission allowances derived in this paper is strongly dependent on the
choice for the underlying control process. Selecting a Wiener process for the control leaves insuf-
ﬁcient parameters for calibrating the model to historical data. We currently study a model leaving
more degrees of freedom in the control that can be studied in the context of stochastic ﬁltering
theory. Results of this survey will be published elsewhere.
Acknowledgement: Michel Verschuere wishes to thank Ingard Moen for useful discussions and
proofreading of the manuscript.
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This paper analyzes how model misspeciﬁcation associated with both interest rate and mortal-
ity risk inﬂuences hedging decisions of a life insurer. For this purpose, diverse risk manage-
ment strategies which are risk-minimizing when model risk isignored come into consideration.
We look at how model risk affects the distribution of the hedging errors associated with these
strategies. The analysis is based on endowment assurances which combine an investment ele-
ment together with a sum assured. Due to periodic premium contributions, i.e., the premium
payments stop in the case of an early death, a loan corresponding to the present value of the
expected delayed premium payments must be asked for by the insurer in order to implement
his hedging decisions. The effect of model risk on this borrowing decision is additionally
analyzed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Endowment assurance products are policies which pay out a sum of money on the death of the life
assured or at a speciﬁed date if the life assured survives the term. This implies that the maturity
date and the payoff of the contracts are conditioned on the death time of the life insured.1 As com-
pensation, the insured provideperiodic premiums until the period before the speciﬁed date, as long
as they are still alive. Obviously,these contracts contain both diversiﬁablemortality risk and trade-
able interest rate risk. Hence, risk management of the issued contracts is based on diversiﬁcation
and hedging, i.e. trading on ﬁnancial market.
In this paper, we analyze how model risk associated with both the future evolution of the
interest rate and the insured’s future life expectancy affects the hedging decision of the insurer.
1About 75% of the life insurance contracts sold in Germany belong to this category.
4344 A. Chen and A. Mahayni
I.e. we consider market incompleteness caused by model misspeciﬁcation associated with both the
interestrateandmortalityrisk. Intheanalysisofpricingand hedgingtheriskexposuretotheissued
contracts, the insurance company makes model assumptionsabout the term structureof the interest
rateand thedeath distribution. However,thecontractfairness andthehedgingeffectivenessdepend
on the true interest rate dynamic and the true death distribution. Model misspeciﬁcation related
to the interest rate risk has always been an issue for life insurers because they have difﬁculties in
date inputs to ﬁnd an appropriate term structure model and reﬂect the true data generating interest
rate process perfectly. Mortality misspeciﬁcation has attracted more and more attention recently. It
can be caused either by a false estimation of the insurer. A medical breakthrough or a catastrophe
can lead to an unexpected increase or decrease in life expectancy to a big extent. Moreover, it
can result from an intentional abuse of the insurer. For example, an insurer might overestimate
the death probability of a potential 70 year’s customer deliberately. By doing this, the (assumed)
expected period of annuity payment is shortened. Consequently, a higher annuity payment can be
offered in order to attract this customer. Due to the fact that it is most of time insurance brokers
who closecontracts with customersand dueto theirown interests which mightbeinconsistentwith
theinsurancecompany’s,this kindof mortalitymisspeciﬁcationis notan uncommonphenomenon.
Concerning the literature on model risk, there is an extensive analysis of ﬁnancial market risk.
Without postulating completeness, we refer to the papers of Lyons (1995), Bergman et al. (1996),
El Karoui et al. (1998), Hobson (1998), and Mahayni (2003), just to quote a few. Certainly, there
are also papers dealing with different scenarios of mortality risk and/or stochastic death distribu-
tions, for instance, Milevsky and Promislow (2001), Blake et al. (2006), Ballotta and Haberman
(2006), and Gr¨ undl et al. (2006). A recent paper of Dahl and Møller (2006) considers the valuation
and hedging problems of life insurance contracts when the mortality intensity is affected by some
stochastic processes. However, to our knowledge, there are no papers which analyze the distribu-
tion of the hedging errors resulting from the combination of both. Therefore, in the present paper,
model risk is investigated by studying how it inﬂuences the distribution of hedging errors. Speak-
ing of hedging errors, we shall determine the underlying hedging strategies. Neglecting model
misspeciﬁcation, the considered strategies are risk-minimizing. The concept of risk-minimizing
is ﬁrstly introduced in F¨ ollmer and Sondermann (1986) and applied to the context of insurance
contracts in Møller (1998). In the considered contract speciﬁcation, the most natural hedging
instruments are given by the corresponding set of zero coupon bonds. Apparently, a strategy con-
taining the entire term structure is an ideal case. In addition to this ideal case, we also consider
a more realistic case where the set of hedging instruments is restricted, i.e. it is only possible to
hedge in a subset of bonds.
In order to initialize the above strategies, the insurer needs an amount corresponding to the ini-
tial contract value, while he only obtains the ﬁrst periodic premium at the beginning. Therefore, a
credit corresponding to the (assumed)expected discounted value of the delayed periodic premiums
shouldbe taken by the insurer, because the initialcontract valueequals the (assumed)present value
of the entire periodic premiums. The insurance company trades with a simple selling strategy to
pay back this loan. Apparently, the effectiveness of this strategy in the liability side depends on
the model risk too.
It turns out that, independent of the model risk associated with the interest rates, an overes-
timation of the death probability yields a superhedge in the mean, i.e. the hedger is on the safe
side on average. In the case that there is no misspeciﬁcation with respect to the mortality risk,
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contrast, the effect of interest rate misspeciﬁcation on the variance is crucial, in particular if the set
of hedging instruments is restricted. In the case that there is no misspeciﬁcation with respect to the
interest rate dynamic, all strategies considered lead to the same variance level, independent of the
mortality. Therefore, the interactivity of both sources of model risk is found to have a pronounced
effect on the risk management of the insurer.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the basic features of
the insurance contract considered. Section 3 introduces the hedging problem and optimal risk-
minimizing hedging strategies. In addition, we study how model misspeciﬁcation affects the dis-
tribution of the hedging errors associated with the relevant strategies. Section 4 illustrates some
numerical results for the distributions of the hedging errors under different scenarios of model
misspeciﬁcation. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
We consider an endowment assurance product with periodic premiums A. In the following, T =
{t0,...,tN−1,tN} denotes a discrete set of equidistant reference dates where ∆t = ti+1 − ti
gives the distance between two reference dates. The insured pays, as long as he lives, a constant
periodic premium A until the last reference date tN−1. In particular, if τx denotes the random
time of death of a live aged x, then the last premium is due at the random time ts where s :=
min{N − 1,n∗(τx)} and n∗(t) := max{j ∈ N0|tj < t}. The insured receives his payoff at the





. We denote the endowment part of the contract speciﬁcation by h and
assume that the insured receives at time T the higher amount of h and an insurance account GT
which depends on his paid premiums. Let ¯ GT denote the payoff at T, then
¯ GT := max{h,GT}.
Notice that the contract speciﬁcation implies that the beneﬁts and contributions depend on the time
of death τx. In the case that GT = 0, we have a simple endowment contract which always pays
out h amount no matter how the death time of the customer evolves. In particular, the insurance
knows exactly its amount of liability but does not know when it is due. In contrast to the simple
endowment contract, we consider contracts which also give a nominal capital guarantee, i.e., the






g(ti−tj), Gti+1 = ˜ Atie
g∆t, i = 0,1,...,N − 1.




¯ Gti+1 1{ti<τx≤ti+1} + ¯ GtN 1{τx>tN}. (1)46 A. Chen and A. Mahayni
3. HEDGING
First, the motivation and derivation of the hedging strategies is based on the value process of the
claim to be hedged.
Proposition 3.1 (Value Process) In our arbitrage-free model setup, the contract value at time




¯ Gtj D(t,tj) tj−1|tj˜ qx+t + ¯ GtN D(t,tN) tN−1˜ px+t,
where tN−1˜ px+t denotes the assumed conditional probability that an x-aged life surviving time T
given that he has survived t, tj−1|tj˜ qx+t the assumed conditional probability that an x–aged life
dies between tj−1 and tj given that he has survived time t, and D(t,tj) the time t-market price of
a zero coupon bond with maturity tj
2.
Proof. Using Equation (1) and standard theory of pricing by no arbitrage implies that the contract
value at t (0 ≤ t < T) is given by the expected discounted payoff under the martingale measure
P ∗, i.e.,
Ct = EP ∗[e
−
R T
t rudu ¯ GT|Ft].
The hedging possibility and effectiveness of a claim depend on the set of available hedging
instruments. With respect to the insurance contract under consideration, the most natural hedging
instruments are given by the set of zero coupon bonds with maturities t1,...,tN, i.e., by the set


















However, due to liquidity constraints in general or transaction costs in particular, it is not possible
or convenient to use all bonds for the hedging purpose. This is modelled in the following by
restricting the class of strategies Φ. The relevant subset is denoted by Ψ ⊂ Φ. To simplify
the exposition, we propose that the assumed interest rate dynamic is given by a one-factor term










Two comments are necessary. First, the assumption of a one-factor term structure model implies
that two bonds are enough to synthesize any bond with maturity {t1,...,tN}. However, the fol-
lowing discussion can easily be extended to a multi-factor term structure model. Second, as the
bonds cease to exist as time goes by, it is simply convenient to use the two bonds with the longest
time to maturity.
2We put tilde on the death/survival probabilities to denote the assumed ones. Similarly, later we put tilde on the
parameters describing term structure of the interest rate to denote the corresponding assumed ones.Hedging guarantees under interest rate and mortality risk 47
As a very conventional hedging criterion used in life insurance contracts, risk-minimizing is
applied here as well. Along the lines of Møller (1998), we derive the risk-minimizing hedging
strategy for both cases: when the entire term structure or when only the last two zero bonds are
used. They are simply denoted by φ and ψ respectively. The motivation and derivation of the
hedging strategies are based on the value process of the claim to be hedged. Proposition 3.1
immediately motivates a duplication strategy on the set {t ≤ τx}. Prior to the death time τx, the
contract value (at time t) can be synthesized by a trading strategy which consists of bonds with
maturities ti (i = n∗(t) + 1,...,N). Assuming that the insurance company will not learn the
death of the customer until no further premiums are paid by the insured implies that the strategy
proceeds on the set t ∈]τx,T] in the same way as on the set t ∈ [0,τx]. Notice that the number of
available instruments, i.e. the number of bonds, decreases as time goes by. At time t, only bonds
with maturities later than n∗(t) are traded, i.e., the hedger buys ¯ Gti · ti−1|ti˜ qx units of D(t,ti) and
¯ GtN tN−1˜ px+t units of D(t,tN). The advantage of using this strategy is that the strategy itself is not
dependent on the model assumptions of the interest rate.
Proposition 3.2 Let φ ∈ Φ denote a risk- (variance-)minimizing trading strategy with respect
to the set of trading strategies Φ. Assume that the insurance company notices the death of the
customer only when no further premium is paid by the insured. If one additionally restricts the set
of admissible strategies to the ones which are independent of the term structure, then it holds: φ is
uniquely determined and for t ∈ [0,T]
φ
(i)
t = 1{t≤ti} ¯ Gti ti−1|ti˜ qx+t i = 1,··· ,N − 1
φ
(N)
t = ¯ GtN tN−1˜ px+t.
Proof. Without the introduction of model risk it is easily seen that Vt0 and the contract value Ct0
according to Proposition 3.1 coincide. Thus, with Proposition 3.1 it follows that φ is self–ﬁnancing
in the mean. Since the stochastic interest rate risk can be eliminated by trading in all “natural” zero
coupon bonds, Møller’s (1998) results concerning the independence of mortality and market risk
can be adopted here. Since an endowment insurance is a mixture of pure endowment and term
insurance, the results immediately follow from Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.9 of Møller (1998).
A one-factor short rate model is complete in two bonds, i.e. the availability of two bonds
with different maturities is enough to synthesize any further bond. Therefore, without postulating
the independence from the interest rate model, the variance-minimizing strategy is not deﬁned
uniquely.
Proposition 3.3 Let ψ denote the risk- (variance-)minimizing trading strategy with respect to the
set of trading strategies Ψ ⊂ Φ. Assuming that the insurance company notices the death of the














+ 1{t≤tN−1} ¯ GtN−1 tN−2|tN−1˜ qx+t



















˜ σti(t) − ˜ σtN(t)




˜ σtN−1(t) − ˜ σti(t)
˜ σtN−1(t) − ˜ σtN(t)
with ˜ σ¯ t(t) denoting the assumed volatility of a zero coupon bond with maturity date ¯ t at time t.




with value process Vt(˜ φ(i)) = α
(i)
t D(t,tN−1) + β(i)D(t,tN) = D(t,ti) for




















2 (t) aregivenasabove. NoticethatVt(˜ φ(i)) = D(t,ti)P-almostsurelyimplies
Var[L∗
T(ψ)] = Var[L∗
T(φ)]. This together with Ψ ⊂ Φ ends the proof.
Obviously, the strategy itself depends on the term structure model of the interest rate. Basically,
by using a one-factor interest model, the risk-minimizingstrategy for the insurance contract can be
implemented in any subset of bonds with at least two elements. A generalization is straightforward
if a hedging instrument is added for every dimension of risk factor which is introduced to the short
rate model.
It is noticed that the implementation of the above strategies is based on taking a credit at t0.
Since the initial value of the hedging strategies is given by the expected value of the premium
inﬂows, the insurer must in fact borrow the amount
PN−1
i=1 A ti˜ px D(t0,ti). The underpinning
strategy for this is to sell A ti˜ px bonds with maturity ti (i = 1,...,tN−1). Under mortality risk,
it is not necessarily the case that the insurer achieves exactly the number of periodic premiums
which are necessary to pay back the credit. These discrepancies lead to extra costs. In particular,
these costs can be understood as a sequence of cash ﬂows, i.e., the insurer has to pay back A ti˜ px
at each time ti (i = 1,...,tN−1), i.e. independent of whether the insured survives. Therefore, the








ti˜ px − 1{τx>ti}
￿
. (2)
Proposition 3.4 (Expected total discounted hedging costs) Let L∗
T denote the discounted total
costs from both the asset and the liability side. φ (ψ) denotes the strategy given in Proposition 3.2
(3.3). Taking account of model risk, EP ∗[L∗
T(φ)] and EP ∗[L∗
T(ψ)] own the same value:
D(t0,tN) ¯ GtN(tNpx − tN ˜ px) +
N−1 X
j=1
(tj−1|tjqx − tj−1|tj˜ qx)D(t0,tj) ¯ Gtj +
N−1 X
i=1
D(t0,ti)A(ti˜ px − tipx).Hedging guarantees under interest rate and mortality risk 49
Proof. This proposition is an immediate consequence of Propositions 3.1 (t = t0), in addition to
taking the expectation of the addition cost term given in Equation (2).
Notice that, independent of the set of bonds, the expected costs are the same. Furthermore,
independent of the model risk related to the interest rate, mortality misspeciﬁcation determines
the sign of the expected value, i.e., that decides when a superhedge in the mean can be achieved.
When no mortality misspeciﬁcation is available, the model risk related to the interest rate has no
impact on the expected value. When there exists mortality misspeciﬁcation, the model risk related
to the interest rate will inﬂuence the size of the expected value. Therefore, the effect of model
risk associated with the interest rate depends on the mortality misspeciﬁcation. However, when
it comes to the analysis of the variance, model risk associated with the interest rate has a more
pronounced effect than mortality misspeciﬁcation.
Proposition 3.5 (Additional variance) It holds
VarP ∗[L
∗
T(ψ)] = VarP ∗[L
∗
T(φ)] + AVT
with AVT = 0 when there exists no model risk related to the interest rate, otherwise

































Proof. The proof is given in Chen and Mahayani (2007).
It should be emphasized that the effect of mortality misspeciﬁcation depends on the model risk
related to the interest rate. If there exists no interest rate misspeciﬁcation, mortality misspeciﬁ-
cation plays no role in the additional variance. However, if there exists model risk related to the
interest rate, an additional variance part results always when the restricted subset of zero coupon
bonds are used as hedging instruments.
As stated in the introduction, mortality misspeciﬁcation can be caused by a deliberate use of
the insurance company for certain purposes, e.g. safety reasons. I.e., a deviation of the assumed
mortality from the true one is generated by a shift in the parameter x which leads to a shift in the
life expectancy. For this purpose, we let tp˜ x and tq˜ x denote the assumed probabilities t˜ px and t˜ qx.











∂ ˜ x < 0. Furthermore, an overestimation of the death probability (an underestimation
of the survival probability) leads to a superhedge in the mean, i.e., EP ∗[L∗
T] ≤ 0.
(ii) The additional variance given in Proposition 3.5 is increasing in ˜ x.
Proof. Proof is given in Chen and Mahayani (2007).50 A. Chen and A. Mahayni
contract parameter interest rate parameter mortality parameter
(Vasi˘ cek model) (Makeham)
g = 0.05 initial spot rate = 0.05
h = 20673.6 (GtN = 35694.6) spot rate volatility = 0.03 H = 0.0005075787
tN = 30 (years) speed of mean reversion = 0.18 K = 0.000039342435
x = 40, A = 500 long run mean = 0.07 c = 1.10291509
Table 1: Basic (assumed) model parameter.
4. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
To illustrate the results of the last sections, we use a one-factor Vasi˘ cek-type model framework to
describe the ﬁnancial market risk and a death distribution according to Makeham. The Vasi˘ cek-
model implies that the volatility σ¯ t(t) of a zero coupon bond with maturity ¯ t is σ¯ t(t) = ¯ σ
κ(1 −
exp{−κ(¯ t − t)}) where κ and ¯ σ are non-negative parameters. ¯ σ is the volatility of the short rate
and κ the speed factor of mean reversion. The death distributionaccording to Makeham is depicted
as follows








µx+t := H + Kc
x+t.
As a benchmark case, we use a parameter constellation along the lines of Delbaen (1990) which
is given in Table 1. We introduce the model risk by taking into account that the model parameters
which are used to construct the hedging strategies may deviate from the true ones. Concerning the
death distribution, we take Makeham hazard rate as an example and concentrate on the mortality
misspeciﬁction caused by the shift in age.
4.1. Expected total costs
Figure 1 demonstrates how the death and survival probability, i.e., tj−1|tjqx changes with the age
x. With the change of x, the death and survival probability demonstrate a parallel shift. If the
true age of the customer is 40, then an assumed age of 50 leads to an overestimation of the death
probability and an assumed age of 30 results in an underestimation of the death probability. Of
course the survival probability and tpx has exactly a reversed trend.
How the expected discounted total costs from both asset and liability side change with the
assumed age ˜ x is depicted in Figure 2. It is noticed that, for the given parameters, the expected
discounted total cost exhibits a negative relation in ˜ x. The higher ˜ x, the lower the expected to-
tal costs. It is observed that, independent of the set of hedging instruments (bonds), the hedger
achieves proﬁts in mean (negative expected discounted cost) if he overestimates the death proba-
bilities.3 Hence, negativeexpected discounted costs result when true x is smaller than the assumed
3This result is opposite to the result in pure endowment insurance contracts, where a negative expected discounted
cost is achieved when an overestimation of the survival probability exists.Hedging guarantees under interest rate and mortality risk 51












Figure 1: tj−1|tjqx for x = 30, 40, 50. The
other parameters are given in Table 1.





































Figure 2: Expected cost for ˜ x = 30, 35, 40, 45,
50 with the real x = 40. The other parameters
are given in Table 1.
one. Converse effects are observed when the insurer underestimates the death probability. Here,
a real age of 40 is taken and it is observed that for ˜ x = 45, 50, the expected costs have negative
values (lower two curves), and for ˜ x = 30, 35, the expected costs exhibit positivevalues. When the
true age coincides with the assumed one, the considered strategy is mean-self-ﬁnancing because
the expected discounted cost equals zero.
4.2. Variance Difference
In contrast to the expected total costs, the distribution of the costs depends on the set of hedging
instruments. This subsection attempts to illustrate how the variance difference depends on the
model risk. Assuming that the short rate is driven by a one-factor Vasi˘ cek model, model risk asso-
ciated with the interest rate can be characterized either by the mismatch of the volatility (¯ σ) or the
speed factor (κ), which are determining factors in the volatility function of the zero coupon bonds.
Due to the Vasi˘ cek modelling, the misspeciﬁcation of ¯ σ has no impact on the variance difference.
Therefore, in the following, we concentrate on the interest rate misspeciﬁcation characterized by
the deviation of the assumed ˜ κ from the true κ.
We obtain some values for the variance difference as exhibited in Table 2. Firstly, there exists
a deviation of ˜ κ from κ, the variances of these two strategies differ, even when there is no mor-
tality misspeciﬁcation. Secondly, mortality misspeciﬁcation does not have impact on the variance
difference, if there are no interest rate misspeciﬁcation available. I.e., these two strategies make no
difference to the variance of the total cost if no model risk associated with the interest rate appears.
Therefore, for ˜ κ = κ = 0.18, overall the variance difference exhibits a value of 0. These two ob-
servations validate the argument that the model misspeciﬁcation resulting from the term structure
of the interest rate has a substantial effect when the variance is taken into account. The effect of
mortality risk is partly contingent on the model risk associated with the interest rate. Thirdly, only
the absolute distance of ˜ κ from κ counts. The bigger this absolute distance is, the higher variance
differences these two strategies result in. Therefore, overall you observe parabolic curves for the
variance difference. In addition, the variance difference increases in ˜ x. This positive effect can be
observed in Figures 3 and 4.
To sum up, if the hedger substantially overestimates (˜ κ << κ) or underestimates (˜ κ >> κ) the52 A. Chen and A. Mahayni
Expected total cost Variance Difference The Ratio
˜ κ ˜ x = 35 ˜ x = 40 ˜ x = 45 ˜ x = 35 ˜ x = 40 ˜ x = 45 ˜ x = 35 ˜ x = 40 ˜ x = 45
0.150 287.795 0 −449.842 774.983 1876.71 4660.65 0.0967 − −0.1518
0.155 293.229 0 −457.831 568.654 1375.73 3414.78 0.0813 − −0.1276
0.160 297.998 0 −464.843 385.079 930.677 2308.87 0.0659 − −0.1034
0.165 302.192 0 −471.014 229.521 554.135 1373.97 0.0501 − −0.0787
0.170 305.891 0 −476.458 108.254 261.073 646.952 0.0340 − −0.0534
0.175 309.159 0 −481.270 28.7651 69.2933 171.608 0.0173 − −0.0272
0.180 312.054 0 −485.532 0 0 0 0 − 0
0.185 314.621 0 −489.315 32.6569 78.4791 194.106 0.0182 − −0.0285
0.190 316.903 0 −492.677 139.546 334.922 827.806 0.0373 − −0.0584
0.195 318.934 0 −495.670 336.029 805.425 1989.29 0.0575 − −0.0890
0.200 320.745 0 −498.338 640.547 1533.21 3783.96 0.0789 − −0.1234
0.205 322.361 0 −500.719 1075.28 2570.10 6338.04 0.1017 − −0.1590
0.210 323.805 0 −502.847 1666.92 3978.35 9802.85 0.1261 − −0.1969
Table 2: Expected total cost, variance differences and the ratio of the standard deviation of the
variance difference and the expected total cost for varying ˜ κ with x = 40 and the other parameters
are given in Table 1.
bond volatilities, and if at the same time he highly overestimates the death probability (˜ x >> x),
the diverse choice of the hedging instruments leads to a huge difference in the variance. On the
contrary, a ˜ κ value close to κ combined with a big overestimationof the survivalprobability(˜ x <<
x) almost leads to very small variance difference. I.e., very close variances result. The choice of
the hedging instrument does not have a signiﬁcant effect under this circumstance. These result
leads to a very interesting phenomenon, with an overestimation of the death probability (˜ x > x),
the insurance company is always on the safe side in mean, i.e., it achieves a superhedge in the
mean. However, if the set of hedging instruments is restricted, an overestimation of the death
probability does not necessarily decrease the shortfall probability under a huge misspeciﬁcation
associated with the interest rate (characterized by a big deviation of ˜ κ from κ). This is due to the



































Figure 3: Variance difference as function of
˜ x with the real x = 40 for ˜ κ = 0.16, ˜ κ =
0.18 and ˜ κ = 0.20. The other parameters are
given in Table 1.




































Figure 4: Variance difference as function of ˜ κ
with the real κ = 0.18 for ˜ x = 35, ˜ x = 40 and
˜ x = 45. The other parameters are given in Table
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observation that a quite high variance difference is reached under this parameter constellation.
In addition, due to the tradeoff between the expected value and the variance difference4, it is
interesting to have a look at the relative size, like the ratio of the standard deviation of the variance
difference and the expected value of the total cost from both asset and liability side. First of
all, this ratio is not deﬁned when the assumed and real age coincide. Second of all, here for the
given parameters, an overestimation of the death probability (˜ x = 45) has a higher effect than an
underestimation (˜ x = 35), i.e. the absolute value of this ratio is larger for the case of ˜ x = 45.
Finally, this ratio can give a hint to the safety loading factor. Assume, the insurer uses standard–
deviation premium principle. The ratio given in Table 2 suggests him how much safety loading to
take when he uses the last two bonds instead of the entire term structure.
5. CONCLUSION
The risk management of an insurance company must take into account model risk, i.e. the uncer-
tainty about the interest rate and the life expectancy. We show that even a small difference between
assumedand realized death scenariosmay haveagreat impactonthehedgingperformancebecause
of the existence of interest rate risk. In practice, this is particularly important because a deviation
of true and assumed mortality/survival probabilities is unavoidable and sometimes even caused
intentionally by the insurance company itself. The problem which is associated with the interde-
pendence of model risk concerning the interest rate dynamic and the mortality distribution is even
more severe if there is a restriction on the set of hedging instruments. We measure the risk im-
pliedby the restrictionofhedging instrumentsby calculating theadditionalvariance ofthehedging
costs, i.e. the variance which is to be added to the variance term without the restriction. Further, we
stress an important problem which arises if, as it is normally done, the contributions of the insured
are given in terms of periodic premiums instead of an up-front premium. If the contributions of the
insured are delayed to a future, uncertain time, model risk inﬂuences the liability side in addition
to the asset side. Theoretically, a credit must be taken by the insurer in order to implement the
considered hedging strategies in the asset side. The insurer achieves not necessarily the number
of periodic premiums which is needed to pay back his credit, which leads to an extra cost to the
insurer. To sum up, neither the model risk which is related to the death distribution nor the one
associated with the ﬁnancial market model is negligible for a meaningful risk management.
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Abstract
The risks involved in the Himalaya options market have never been more evident than in recent
years as these options have been responsible for heavy losses over that period. These losses
have occurred not only because of adverse market conditions but also because of model mis-
speciﬁcations. Principal among the dangers of pricing is the inability to ﬁnd a volatility model
which is consistent with the observed volatility surfaces of individual stocks involved in the
Himalayan. In this paper we present a solution to this problem by using a multivariate mixture
of densities technique. We outline the practical implications of extending this technique to the
Himalayan setting and present our numerical results in detail.
1. INTRODUCTION
Himalayan options ﬁrst appeared in 1998 when they were introduced by Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale as part
of their mountain range series of options. At the time the Himalayan was an entirely new type of
derivativeproductthatmergedthepathdependencyofbarrieroptionswiththemultidimensionality
ofbasket options. Since thenseveralderivativeshaveemulatedthestructureoftheHimalayanmost
notably the Emerald option which has been introduced on Nordic markets.
Although the Himalayan contains some very exotic traits they can be classiﬁed as European in
nature and as such their pricing is heavily dependent on the usual sensitivities, namely correlation
estimation and the volatility smile. In any basket type option correlation plays a major role in
pricing, thus signiﬁcant care is required when estimating this parameter. Including historical cor-
relation directly in pricing is a risk since underlying correlations can change signiﬁcantly during
times of market stress. The issue of modeling the volatility smile is of great practical importance
for a Himalayan because when stocks are removed from the basket the smilecan become distorted.
The primary concern of this paper is to apply a mixture of densities technique to the pricing of
Himalayan options in order to deal with the volatility smile. This is done by applying a method
developedby Brigo et al. (2004)which constructsan entirelynew manifoldoflocalvolatilitystruc-
tures and removes the need for costly time discretization which is common for the conventional
mixture of densities model.
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This paper is split into four sections. The ﬁrst is a brief review of the Himalayan option includ-
ing a description of some of the different variants available. The second covers the conventional
approach to the multidimensional mixture of densities and then explains the multivariate mixture
of densities (MVMD) developed by Brigo et al. (2004). We then apply their technique to the
Himalayan option and ﬁnally we end with conclusions and thoughts on further work.
2. HIMALAYAN OPTIONS
A Himalayan may most simply be described as a call on the sum of the best performers on a basket
of stocks over a certain time interval. At the beginning of the contract a collection of exercise
dates is decided upon. The number of dates may be equal to the number of stocks in the basket
or depending on the variant of the Himalayan it could be less. At each of these dates the best
performing stock (according to a speciﬁed performance measure) is permanently removed from
the basket and its return becomes a coupon. This process is then repeated at each exercise date
until there is only one stock left.
Suppose we have a Himalayan written on the underlying stocks S1,S2,...,Sn and that the
contract is active over the time interval [0,T]. This interval is then split into n subintervals written
as:
[t0,t1],[t1,t2],...,[ti−1,ti],...,[tn−1,tn]
where t0 = 0 and tn = T. The end point of each of these intervals represents the n exercise dates
where the best performing stock will be removed from the basket. Ignoring discounting, the payoff



























where A is the nominal amount associated with the contract and the index m(i) records the best
performer of the stocks which remain on the interval [ti−1,ti]. We will illustrate the difference
between both variants by way of an example.Dealing with the Volatility Smile of Himalayan Options 57
Months
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
A 105.18 100.00 96.54 87.45 91.40 92.89 89.06
B 9.12 10.63 11.14 15.67 14.12 13.56 16.76
C 48.97 50.90 58.97 55.40 60.20 61.23 65.45
D 15.62 17.53 25.73 30.91 32.00 34.71 38.49
E 90.14 100.05 105.36 107.86 111.65 116.23 121.49
F 90.36 84.99 89.11 93.06 96.96 99.01 94.62
Table 1: Stock Price Table
Monthly Returns
1 2 3 4 5 6 Coupon
A −0.05 −0.08 −0.17 −0.13 −0.12 −0.15 −0.15
B 0.16 0.16
C 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.23
D 0.12 0.64 0.64
E 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.20
F −0.06 −0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.10
Table 2: Stock Price Returns
Suppose we have a Himalayan of the type (1) written on six underlying stocks A, B, C, D, E and F
with table 1 charting the closing price of these stocks over six time periods. Table 2 calculates the
terminal payoff of the Himalayan in this situation. The ﬁrst column of table 2 shows the return of
each stock over period one. As is shown B has the highest return thus this return is locked in as the
ﬁrst coupon and B is removed from the basket. This process is then repeated in the next 5 columns
with the ﬁnal column showing the contribution of each stock to payoff of the Himalayan. The
payoff is then the sum of the coupons. In this case the payoff was 1.18. The Himalayan described
in (2) could have improved on this payoff since the contribution of A would have been ﬂoored at
zero giving a payoff of 1.33.



























where L < n. This can have the effect of increasing the payout since stocks that have performed
badly over the entire contract can be excluded from the payout. In our example if we had let L = 5
then the payout would have excluded A which performed poorly.58 J. Meaney
The structure of the Himalayan can be changed drastically by calculating the returns in a dif-
ferent manner. Instead of returns being relative to the initial prices at the start of the contract we
can calculate returns over a period relative to the opening price of stocks at the beginning of that



























This variation tends to wipe out the bad past performances of stocks and although returns will de-
crease as more stocks are removed from the basket the ﬁnal payout will in general be higher than
the structure (1) and (2). For a more detailed description of the Himalayan option see Overhaus
(2002).
3. MIXTURE OF DENSITIES (MD)
The issue of volatility modeling is of great importance for Himalayan options since each of the
stocks involvedwith the option and the basket itselfare likely to show a volatilitysmile. In order to
deal with this we propose to use a multivariate mixture of densities (MVMD) technique developed
by Brigo et al. (2004) in the context of Himalayas.
Suppose we have a stock S which exhibits a non constant volatility and obeys dynamics given
by the equation
dSt = µStdt + σ(St,t)StdWt
under the T forward measure QT where µ is constant, W is a standard Brownian motion and σ is
well behaved function which obeys linear growth conditions. Under these circumstances a unique
solutionto theaboveSDE exists. The aim of theMD techniqueis to ﬁnd thelocal volatilityof St in
terms of the marginal densities of N auxiliary processes zk





















with λk ≥ 0 for all k and
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the corresponding dynamics for S(t) admits a unique strong solution with local volatility as shown
previously. As a consequence of (7) pricing a European option becomes immediate since mixing
basic lognormal densities leads to analytically tractable option prices under the model process for
the underlying asset. In the case of a European call on the stock S with maturity T and strike K













T(x) are the marginal densities of the auxiliary equations and D0T is the discounting factor
over [0,T]. This MD model allows accurate calibration to any smile shaped volatility curve or
surface. Freedom when choosing the number of auxiliary equations offers great ﬂexibility and
as a consequence of the pricing formula for European calls calibration to entire implied volatility
structures over several strike prices and maturities are possible. We now leave the single stock MD
and look at the multivariate case.
Suppose we wish to evaluate the price of an option which depends on several underlying assets
that each show a volatility smile. In order to price an option such as this, using the conventional
MD method, we would begin by calibrating the volatility surface of each of the stocks using the
single asset MD shown in the previous section. Once the dynamics of each of the stocks is found
a Monte Carlo simulation would be used to price the option by using paths suitably discretized
according to the drift rate of each of the stocks and a diffusion matrix given by the local volatility.
Using an instantaneous correlation structure ρij calculated through a technique such as historical
analysis and supposed constant over time, the Monte Carlo method would proceed by simulating
the joint evolution of the stocks over the time grid [τ0,τ1],...,[τn−1,τn] with a covariance matrix
























Thus the stocks in our basket will evolve according to











Si(τm)(Wτm+1 − Wτm).60 J. Meaney
This scheme will certainly price an option on a basket of stocks. However, by imposing that the
covariance of the multidimensional process to be of the form of (8) we will be moving within a
given manifold of the possible local volatility structures. Discretization is also a costly procedure
for even the most simple of derivatives.
The multivariate mixture of densities (MVMD) technique of Brigo et al. (2004) deals with
these problems by forming the marginal density of the multivariate process in a completely new
fashion. Again suppose we wish to price an option written on the underlying assets S1,...,Sn
with marginal densities pi
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For simplicity we’ll assume that each stock has the same number of auxiliary equations N. The
















































and ρlm is the historical correlation between Sl and Sm.
In words this joint density function mixes all of the possible volatilities and combines them as
a convex combination while ensuring consistency with the initial models for the individual stocks.
The same historical correlations ρij are imposed on the densities at the constituent level but at
the level of the actual process the correlations are more complex. Because of the form of the
component volatilities pricing becomes immediate with this new method. Rather than employing
a costly discretization scheme as was required for the conventional method, we can run a set of
single step Monte Carlo integrations for each combination (i1,...,in).Dealing with the Volatility Smile of Himalayan Options 61
4. PRICING HIMALAYAN OPTIONS WITH MVMD
We will now apply the MVMD to the pricing of a Himalayan written on stocks that show a smile
like volatility. Suppose we have a Himalayan written on two stocks S1,S2 over two time periods
[t0,t1] and [t1,t2]. Assuming a deterministic risk free rate, the value of the Himalayan at any time
during the contract can be denoted by a generic pricing function G(t;0,T,A). The terminal payoff
of the Himalayan can then be written as:
G(T;0,T,A) = g(S1(t1),S2(t1),S1(t2),S2(t2)) = g(S)
where the function g : R4
+ → R represents the payout given by one of the Himalayas described
earlier. The initial price is then the discounted expected value of the payout under the risk neutral








Provided that the density function p(S1(t1),S2(t1),S1(t2),S2(t2)) is known, this four dimensional
integral can be evaluated numerically via Monte Carlo methods to give the initial price of the
Himalayan.
Applying the MVMD to the Himalayan now becomes apparent. Suppose we have calibrated
the volatility surfaces of our two stocks according to the mixture:
S1 : (λ11,λ12) = (0.9,0.1), (σ11,σ12) = (0.4,0.1)
S2 : (λ21,λ22) = (0.8,0.2), (σ21,σ22) = (0.2,0.15).








where the f(ij) functions are as deﬁned in the previous section and h(Sm(t2)) is the distribution of
theremaining stock overthesecond period which will be a mixtureof lognormalsdetermined from
the initial calibration. In this case the problem of incorporating the smile effect into the Himalayan
now becomes one of calculating four integrals over the ﬁrst period. Each of these integrals prices
a Himalayan written on two underlying stocks that follow geometric Brownian motion with ﬂat
volatility smiles. The theory allows for term structure to be included in the volatility, but in our
examples volatility will be kept constant. For the density f(ij) the auxiliary stocks will have the
following dynamics over period one:
dS1(t) = µS1(t)dt + σ1iS1(t)dW1
dS2(t) = µS2(t)dt + σ2jS2(t)dW2.62 J. Meaney
The appropriate payoff will then be applied to the stocks and one of them will be eliminated. This
determines the density h(Sm) in each of the four integrals which is written in terms of its two
constituent densities. Thus the density function will be made up of eight terms with the general




where over period two the auxiliary stock Sm(t) follows the dynamics
dSm(t) = µSm(t)dt + σmkSm(t)dWm.
The correlation between the auxiliary stocks will be the same as the historical correlation ρ be-
tween the stocks S1 and S2. Accurate estimation of this parameter is crucial for pricing Himalayas
with smile characteristics. In ﬁgure 1 we plot the initial price of various Himalayan options written
on the stocks S1 and S2 over two equal time periods. In each plot the overall level of historical
correlation is varied while the volatility of the individual stocks remains unchanged. These prices
are calculated using one hundred thousand Monte Carlo paths. The risk free rate is ﬁxed at 0.1
and both stocks have an initial price of 100. The plots ﬁrstly indicate that regardless of the level of
the volatility smile the locally ﬂoored Himalayan of type (2) has very little correlation sensitivity.
The globally ﬂoored Himalayan in (1) is long correlation for both the ﬂat and mild volatility smile.
This is an expected result since the globally ﬂoored variant is an option on the performance of the
overall basket rather than an option on the individual stocks. However when the smile becomes
more prominent the Himalayan shows no sensitivity to correlation. The Himalayan (6) with pe-
riodic performance is short correlation for all levels of the volatility smile. This is unsurprising
since the structure is similar to a best of option on the two stocks and then an option on the single
remaining stock. Both of these are short correlation so their sum will also be short correlation. In a
similar manner the Himalayan variant (5) also has short correlation for both the constant volatility
and smile like volatility.
It should be noted that when using the MVMD technique the actual correlation between S1 and
S2 will not be the same as the historical correlation ρ which is used in the conventional method.
Thecovariance of thestocks is also different. Through the multidimensionalKolmogorovequation
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Comparing these with (7) and (8) we see that the variances of the stocks take on a new structure.
The variances of the two stocks are now fully dependent on each other in a manner which is
not seen in the conventional method. In fact it can be shown that the variance and covariance
of the conventional method can be seen as an approximation for the MVMD technique valid for
weakly correlated systems. In ﬁgure 2 we plot the conventional price and MVMD price of a type
(5) Himalayan written on S1 and S2. For low correlations the two prices coincide but for larger
correlations they diverge.














































































Figure 1: Price against varying correlation for Himalayans of type (1) (dashed line) and (2) in the left column and
type (5) (dashed line) and (6) in the right column. Component volatilities are ﬁxed at (σ11,σ12) = (0.4,0.1) and
(σ21,σ22) = (0.2,0.15). The λ values vary. Top: (λ11,λ12) = (1,0) and (λ21,λ22) = (1,0). Middle: (λ11,λ12) =
(0.9,0.1) and (λ21,λ22) = (0.8,0.2). Bottom: (λ11,λ12) = (0.5,0.5) and (λ21,λ22) = (0.5,0.5)64 J. Meaney


























Figure 2: Price against varying correlation for the conventional method (dashed) and MVMD method. Component
volatilities are ﬁxed at (σ11,σ12) = (0.4,0.1) and (σ21,σ22) = (0.2,0.15). The λ values vary. Left: (λ11,λ12) =
(0.9,0.1) and (λ21,λ22) = (0.8,0.2). Right: (λ11,λ12) = (0.99,0.01) and (λ21,λ22) = (0.95,0.05)
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have outlined the MVMD technique and shown how to apply this to many variants of the Hi-
malayan option. The main advantage of this technique is that it allows us to price options with
single step Monte Carlo calculations. This is a major improvement over the the conventional mix-
ture of densities which relies on costly time discretization and simple correlations. A comparison
between the conventional MD and the MVMD has also validated theoretical results. The price of
a Himalayan calculated using the two methods diverges for larger correlations. The MVMD also
allows accurate modeling of stock distribution. In particular greater attention can be given to the
tails which is important because of the maximization process which is embedded into the payout
function. Our calculations illustrate the sensitivity of Himalayas to the historical correlation be-
tween stocks and they also show how the smile of individual stocks can change the behavior of the
option. Further work could include comparing this method to stochastic volatility models which
can be used to price Himalayas and studying the ﬁt of MVMD model correlation against actual
correlations.
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The extent to which the money supply affects the aggregate cash balance demanded at a cer-
tain level of nominal income and interest rates is determined by the interest-rate-elasticity and
stability of the money demand. An actuarial approach is adopted in this paper for dealing
with investors facing liquidity constraints and maintaining different expectations about risks.
Under such circumstances, a level of surplus exists which maximises expected value. More-
over, when the distorted probability principle is introduced, the optimal liquidity demand is
expressed as a Value at Risk and the comonotonic dependence structure determines the amount
of money demanded by the economy. As a consequence, the more unstable the economy, the
greater the interest-rate-elasticity of the money demand. Moreover, for different parametric
characterisation of risks, market parameters are expressed as the weighted average of sectorial
or individual estimations, in such a way that multiple equilibria of the economy are possible.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the Keynes’s liquidity preference proposition, the demand for cash balances is pos-
itively affected by the level of income and negatively affected by the return offered by a class
of money substitutes, see Keynes (1935). The ﬁrst part of the proposition is a consequence of
the assumption that the amount of transactions is proportional to the level of income. To explain
the effect of the interest rate, Keynes emphasises the inﬂuence of capital ﬂuctuations in decision-
making. Thus, investors expecting interest rates to rise demand fewer risk-free securities in order
to avoid capital losses — since the price of such instruments is expected to diminish in this case.
By contrast, when interest rates are expected to fall, more bonds are demanded — in this way,
capital gains can be attained after the collapse of interest rates. Therefore, fewer provisions are
maintained for high levels of the interest rate and vice versa.
In macroeconomic analysis, the level of prices establishes the connection between nominal
magnitudes, expressed in monetary units, and real quantities, which represent ﬂows of goods and
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services. Accordingly, Y = P · y, where P, Y and y respectively denote the level of prices, the
nominal income and the real income. Let us additionally denote by M the total money supply.
Therefore, the short-run monetary equilibrium is given by the quantity equation:
M = P y · l(r) = Y · l(r). (1)
The liquidity preference function l(r) expresses the ratio between demanded cash balances and
nominal income. It is not likely to be constant but it may change slowly over time. The inverse
ratio of the liquidity preference function is called velocity of money.
Any change in the money supply will require a change in one or more of the variables de-
termining the liquidity demand (i.e. P, y or r) in order to reestablish the monetary equilibrium.
When prices are rigid for short-run ﬂuctuations and the real product remain stable in short-terms,
the whole adjustment is performed in l(r). In addition, if the liquidity preference is absolute, i.e. if
investorsare satisﬁedat asingleleveloftheinterestrate,1 theamountofmoneycan change without
a change in either nominal income or interest rates. Under such circumstances, monetary policy is
useless for dealing with short-run ﬂuctuations. The situation is different if prices are ﬂexible and
liquidity preference is non-absolute. Then a monetary expansion produces a new equilibrium in-
volving a higher price for the same quantity, the higher this response the more inelastic the money
demand. In the short-run, production is encouraged until prices are reestablished at their original
level. In the long-run, new producers enter the market and existing plants are expanded, as claimed
by Friedman (1970).
Under such circumstances, the efﬁcacy of monetary policy depends on the degree of rigidity
of prices and the elasticity of the money demand, as well as on the stability of liquidity prefer-
ence. There is a consensus among researchers about the existence of a stable long-run relation-
ship, though ﬂuctuations of cash balances in the short-run remain unexplained. Episodes like the
missing money in the mid-seventies, the great velocity decline in the early eighties, followed by
the expansion of narrow money in the mid-eighties, or the velocity puzzle of the mid-nineties, still
lack a satisfactory explanation, see Ball (2001) and Ball (2002), Carpenter and Lange (2002) and
Teles and Zhou (2005). In accounting for such drawbacks, recent literature has focused on uncer-
tainty, which is supposed to have been incremented after 1980 due to deregulation and ﬁnancial
innovations, as in Atta-Mensah (2004), Baum et al. (2002), Carpenter and Lange (2002), Choi and
Oh (2003) and Greiber and Lemke (2005). Deregulation and ﬁnancial innovation are also given as
arguments to support the role of the opportunity cost in accounting for unexplained ﬂuctuations,
see Ball (2002), Collins and Anderson (1998), Duca (2000), Dreger and Wolters (2006) and Teles
and Zhou (2005). According to this view, a stable long-run relationship exists and movements of
the interest rate can explain all short-run episodes, as long as the right monetary aggregate is used.
In this paper, an extended model is proposed according to which liquidity preference is ex-
plicitly determined by uncertainty and information. First, the cash demand of a single represen-
tative investor is obtained. Investors are supposed to face liquidity constraints and consequently,
in Section 2 equity is treated as an additional liability. In addition, the behaviour towards risk is
determined by the transformation of probabilities according to an informational parameter. Then
1Absolute liquidity preference corresponds to the case when the liquidity demand is perfectly elastic with respect
to the interest rate. According to Keynes, the degree of elasticity depends on how homogeneous expectations are,
where perfect elasticity is obtained when expected and actual values are the same. In this case, money and risk-free
securities are perfect substitutes — since no capital gains or losses are expected.Short-Run Monetary Equilibrium 69
the expected return of the fund is maximised when the mathematical expectation of the residual
exposure (a measure of the cost of assuming bankruptcy) plus the opportunity cost of capital is
minimised. In this way, I follow Dhaene et al. (2003) and Goovaerts et al. (2005), who on these
terms develop a mechanism for capital allocation. When looking for the aggregated surplus in Sec-
tion 3, capital is supposed to be provided by a central authority or ﬁnancial intermediaries acting in
a competitivemarket, in such a way that a singleinterest rate is required for lending. Hence the sit-
uation is similar to the case of a centralised conglomerate distributing capital among subsidiaries,
as in Dhaene et al. (2003), Goovaerts et al. (2005) and Mierzejewski (2006), and the opportunity
cost of money is related to the average return overa class of money substitutes. Thus, monetary ag-
gregates are determinants of liquidity preference in the model. Finally, within a Gaussian setting,
the aggregate exposure is normally distributed and its volatility is equal to the weighted average of
individual volatilities. Therefore, aggregation plays a role in the determination and stability of the
liquidity demand. The same results are obtained when marginal risks are exponentially and Pareto
distributed. The ﬁnal remarks are given in Section 4.
2. THE RATIONAL MONEY DEMAND
Since in frictionless markets the amount of cash maintained for precautionary purposes can be
modiﬁed at any time by lending and borrowing, managers who maximise value demand no equity
—whichisactuallythepropositionestablishedbyModiglianiand Miller(1958). However,averse-
to-risk customers are sensible to ﬂuctuations and, as long as the business activities of ﬁnancial
intermediaries — which accordingly are said to be opaque — are not observed by outsiders, a
pressureis establishedto be perceivedas default-free, as suggested by Merton (1997). In themodel
developedbyTobin(1956), averse-to-riskinvestorsshowliquiditypreference asbehaviourtowards
uncertainty. Assuming that risks follow Gaussian distributions, a linear relationship is established
between the expected returns and volatilities of the portfolios containing a proportion of a certain
fund and a cash guarantee, which determines the set of efﬁcient portfolios — in the sense that for
any combination outside the line, it is always possible to build a new fund providing the same
expected return and a lower risk, or the same risk but a higher return. The way preferences affect
portfolio decisions can then be analysed in the plane of expected returns and volatilities, where
the indifference curves of risk-lovers should present a negative slope, as long as such individuals
accept a lower expected return if there is a chance to obtain additional gains. By contrast, averse-
to-risk investors do not take more risk unless they are compensated by a greater expected return
and consequently, their indifference curves have positive slopes. Therefore, for any risk-aversion
proﬁle, the optimal combination is determined by the (tangency point of) intersection between the
unique indifference curve representing preferences and the line of efﬁcient portfolios.
Let us analyse in the following how the Tobin’s model is affected by the hypothesis of imper-
fect competition, a case where risks belong to a general class of probability distributions which
economic agents distort according to their information and knowledge when making decisions.
Moreover, liquidity constraints are faced when borrowing and lending and managers have to ex-
pend effort to correctly assess prices. Let the parameter θ denote the state of information of an
investor holding a mutual fund whose percentage return is represented by the random variable X.70 Fernando Mierzejewski
Because of the precautionary motive, a guarantee L is maintained for a determined period of time
to avoid bankruptcy. In order to introduce in the model the effect of liquidity constraints, equity is
regarded as an additional liability and the size of the guarantee is expressed as a proportion of the
level of income Y , such that L = Y ·l, where l represents the proportion of income assigned to the
non-risky asset. Hence, if r0 denotes the risk-free interest rate, the percentage capital return of the
total portfolio can be expressed as Y = X −l −r0 ·l and decisions are affected by the percentage
return on income:
µθ,Y = Eθ[Y ] = (µθ,X − l) − r0 · l.
In giving a meaning to the informational parameter θ, let us stress the fact that expectations are
wanted to be modiﬁed. Then probability beliefs are transformed by a distortion parameter which is
supposed to be determined by information and knowledge and the proportional hazards distortion










The cumulative and decumulative (also known as survival) probability distribution functions have
been introduced, Fθ,X(x) = Pθ [X ≤ x] = 1 − Pθ [X > x] = 1 − Gθ,X(x). When θ > 1,
the expected value of risk is overestimated and it is underestimated when θ < 1, in this way
respectively accounting for the behaviour of averse-to-risk and risk-lover investors.
Notice, however,thatindividualsreact differentlydependingonthesignofthecapitalreturn. In
fact, when a loss is suffered, cash is demanded to avoid default, while in the case a gain is obtained
the surplus can be used to pay current liabilities or assigned to new investments. Hence, decision-
makers mainly concerned about the speculative and the precautionary motives respectively focus








. Let us accordingly assume that capital decisions






≈ Eθ [X+] − rθ,X · l.
Since the term rθ,X > 0 represents the absolute value of the marginal reduction in insured capital
gains produced when attracting an additional unit of equity, it can be regarded as a premium for
solvency. Hence the following expression is obtained for the expected percentage income:




− (r0 + rθ,X) · l.
Under such conditions, precautionary investors that maximise value minimise bankruptcy costs.
Applying Lagrange optimisation, we obtain that decision makers attract funds until the marginal








− (r0 + rθ,X) = Gθ,−X (l
∗) − (r0 + rθ,X) = 0.
Equivalently, it can be said that investors stop demanding money at the level at which the marginal
expected gain in solvency equals its opportunity cost. Thus the optimal cash demand is given by:
lθ,X (r0 + rθ,X) = G
−1
θ,−X (r0 + rθ,X). (2)Short-Run Monetary Equilibrium 71
From this expression, the money demand follows a decreasing and — as long as the distribu-
tion function describing uncertainty is continuous — continuous path, whatever the kind of risks
and distortions. The minimum and maximum levels of surplus are respectively demanded when
(r0 + rθ,X) ≥ 1 and (r0 + rθ,X) ≤ 0.
In practical applications, intermediaries face operational and administrative costs, at the time
that a premium over the risk-free interest rate is asked for lending in secondary markets. Hence,
the return r0 +rθ,X can be interpreted as a net opportunity cost. Though environmental facts, such
as the perception of credit quality and gains in efﬁciency because of improvements on analysis
and administration, are expected to evolute on time, we can regard them as softly modiﬁed —
and not a matter of speculation. Also the risk attitude of managers is supposed to remain more
or less unchanged. Therefore, the parameter θ is expected to remain stable and consequently, as
long as the probability distribution of the random variable X is also stable, the capital decisions
of investors should remain more or less the same and the economy as a whole should behave
accordingly.
However, if probability distributions are allowed to evolve on time — i.e. if the processes of
capital gains and losses are not stationary — so does the premium for solvency rθ,X. Actually,
this can be the case after a monetary expansion — which can be performed by the central bank as
well as by the entrance of new investors — since as long as part of the extra money is used to buy
ﬁnancial securities and the increment in demand is high and persistent enough to induce the price




is pushed to increase. In a similar way, a monetary
contraction can press the insured return to decrease. This situation might in turn impel decision-
makers to actualise expectations and so the informational parameter θ might be modiﬁed. But this
adjustment is supposed to be produced with a certain delay — for time is required for analysis
— while the opportunity cost may be instantaneously altered. Therefore, changes in the stock
of money may induce instability from within in secondary markets. Adjustments are performed
along a stable money demand relationship, though the process may be reinforced by structural
modiﬁcations once expectations are actualised.
3. SHORT-RUN MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
In order to obtain an expression for the cash balance demanded by the whole economy, let us
assume that economic agents hold aggregate exposures characterised by the random variables
X1,...,Xn. Capital is supplied by a central authority at a single interest rate r (or, equivalently,
secondary markets are regarded as competitive and ﬁnancial intermediaries are price takers) re-
lying on the informational parameter θ and the uncertainty introduced by the market portfolio X.










The second equality is a mathematical identity as long as the process of capital gains and losses of
themarketportfolioisdescribedbythecomonotonicsumX = Xc
1+···+Xc




￿−1 denotes the distribution function of the comonotonic sum when marginal dis-72 Fernando Mierzejewski
tributions are given by (Gθ1,−X1,...,Gθn,−Xn). Comonotonicity characterises an extreme case of
dependence, when no beneﬁt can be obtained from diversiﬁcation.2 Thus precautionary investors
rely on the most pessimistic case, when the failure in any single ﬁrm spreads all over the market.
The dependence of the liquidity demand on the variability of income becomes explicit in a
Gaussian setting. Let us assume in the following that individual exposures are distributed as Gaus-
sians with means µ1,...,µn and volatilities σ1,...,σn, while the contributions of individual ex-
posures to the market portfolio are given by the coefﬁcients λ1,...,λn, with 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 ∀i, such
that Y i = λi · Y and Y = Y 1 + ··· + Y n. Volatilities are expressed as proportions of the lev-
els of income and can be interpreted as the volatilities of different funds as well as the distorted
volatilities of the same Gaussian exposure — or some intermediate case. Under such conditions,
the comonotonic sum is also a Gaussian random variable, see Dhaene et al. (2002), whose mean




λi · µi & σ =
n X
i=1
λi · σi. (3)
On these grounds, the weighted average mean and volatility describe the uncertainty of the market
portfolio. In particular, high volatility may be induced by a single group, as a negative externality
to more efﬁcient companies and so the possibilityof contagion naturally arises in the model. In the
sameway, stabilitymay be inherited by less efﬁcient institutionswhen low volatilitypredominates.
Since the quantile function of a Gaussian random variable can be expressed in terms of the
standard Normal distribution Φ (see Dhaene et al. (2002)), the short-run monetary equilibrium is
described by the following equation:








Therefore, the monetary equilibrium can be reestablished by modifying the level of nominal in-
come Y , the average return µ, the market volatility σ or the interest rate r. As already stated,
only r is expected to change in the short-run. Monitoring and analysis induce investors to eventu-
ally incorporate the new regime of X in decision making and possibly modify expectations, both
determinants of µ and σ.
The difference between the classic and the extended model can be noticed by comparing Equa-
tions 1 and 4. Thus, while in Equation 1 the elasticity of incomewith respect to the stock of money
exclusively depends on the interest rate through the liquidity preference function, in Equation 4
it is also affected by uncertainty. In addition, if y represents the level of real income, the new
short-run equilibrium can be written in real terms as:








Therefore, to stabilise the product it is also required to control the market risk. A proper monetary
policy should then consider a combination of P, µ, σ and r compatible with a given level of
income. The level of σ that preserves the monetary equilibrium for given values of M, Y , µ
and r can be regarded as the induced volatility. A tentative criterion for monetary policy may then
involvethedeterminationofthelevelofinterestrates ensuringa giveninﬂationand induced market
2The inverse probability distribution of the comonotonic sum is given by the sum of the inverse marginal distribu-
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volatility. Additionally, the non-distorted volatility can be estimated by the standard deviation of
the random variable X representing the capital losses of the market portfolio. A measure of the
degree of distortion performed by the market is thus determined by the difference between the
induced and the non-distorted volatility.
An alternative representation is obtained by considering that individual exposures are expo-
nentially distributed. In this case, the comonotonic sum is also exponentially distributed (see
Dhaene et al. (2002)), such that if β1,...,βn denote the informational types of investors, with
βi ≥ 0 ∀i, and, as before, λ1,...,λn represent the marginal contributions to the aggregate income,
with 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 ∀i, then the exponential parameter of the market portfolio is expressed as the





Therefore, the liquidity preference function of the economy is given by:
lβ(r) = −β · ln(r), with β > 0. (5)
Thus, the higher the parameter β, which within this framework completely characterises risk, the
more sensitive is liquidity preference to the cost of capital. In this way, uncertainty is explicitly
related to the monetary equilibriumand hence to theterms of liquidity— determined by themoney
supply.
When marginal risks are Pareto distributed, the survival probability distributions as estimated
by decision-makers are given by:
G−Xi(x) = x
− 1
αi, with αi > 0 and x > 1.
The parameters α1,...,αn correspond to the states of information of investors. As long as they
agree on a singlevalueα, thecomonotonicsum is also Pareto distributed(see Dhaene et al. (2002))
and liquidity preference is given by:
lα(r) = n · r
−α. (6)
Under different expectations, the comonotonic sum is not necessarily Pareto distributed. However,
an estimation of the parameter α can be found such that Equation 6 determines the monetary
equilibrium. In this case, the point interest-rate-elasticity is constant and equal to α. Many models
for the estimation of the money demand are supported on this assumption.
4. CONCLUSIONS
An extended model is presented in this paper — also referred to as the imperfect competition
model — to characterise the liquidity preference of investors facing liquidity constraints. Under
such circumstances, a level of surplus exists that maximises value and the rational money demand
is determined by the quantile function — a measure of the probability accumulated in the tail of74 Fernando Mierzejewski
the distribution function — of the random variable representing the series of capital proﬁts and
losses of the residual exposure (Equation 2). In this way, an equivalence is established between a
conﬁdence level and the opportunity cost of capital and the optimal amount of cash is determined
by the exchange of a sure return and a ﬂow of probability. An informational parameter, affecting
the opportunity cost of money, represents the expectations of decision makers. Averse-to-risk and
risk-lover investors respectively under and overestimate the cost of capital and so they respectively
demand more and less equity.
The importance attached to liquidity preference in macroeconomic analysis is a consequence
of the fact that it determines the short-run monetary equilibrium of the economy. In the classic
approach, the amount of money which is compatible with given levels of nominal income and
interest rates can be obtained from Equation 1, see Friedman (1970). According to the extended
model presented in this paper, the aggregate money demand of the economy is given by the sum
of the liquidity preferences of investors, mathematically characterised by the comonotonic sum
of individual exposures. The aggregate money demand is thus expressed as a Value-at-Risk but
referred to a market portfolio which relies on the most pessimistic case, when no gain can be
obtained from diversiﬁcation. In a Gaussian setting, the comonotonic sum is also a Gaussian
variable, whose volatility is equal to the weighted average of individual volatilities (Equation 4).
In this way, the classic model is extended allowing a correction for risk.
Within the imperfect competition framework, the total stock of money M, the level of income
Y , the interest rate r, the mean µ and the market volatility σ are all determinants of the short-run
monetary equilibrium (Equation 4). Thus, as long as part of the funds available in the economy
are spent on capital assets, an adjustment in the opportunity cost r is expected in the short-run —
stimulated by the modiﬁcation of the stochastic nature of capital gains — which is supposed to in-
stantaneously affect liquidity preference. In the medium-term, investors correct their expectations
and so part of the adjustment may be performed through informational shocks affecting the aggre-
gate mean or the market volatility. An important feature of the mechanism is that the evolution of
risks, motivated by ﬂows of funds, determines expectations and not the opposite, though liquidity
preference might also be affected by a purely informational shock.
As pointed out in Section 2, liquiditypreference is not affected in thesame way by capital gains
and losses. Thus, while positive returns affect the opportunity cost of money and so determine a
movement along a stable relationship, the precautionary attitude of decision makers depends on
negative returns, as does the shape of the money demand (see Equation 2). The ﬁrst adjustment
is supposed to occur instantaneously, while the second one is performed gradually, for it takes
time for investors to internalise new market conditions. In practice, both decisions are related to
different markets. Accordingly, the cost of equity r is represented by the average return over a
class of securities, other than cash, that can be regarded as substitutes to money. On the other
hand, the liquidity preference function depends on the series of returns over a set of instruments
that are representative for the assumed exposures. Then the variability showed by a representative
index of this class determines the market volatility σ.
Finally, as stated in Equation 3, in a Gaussian setting the expected value of the market portfolio
and the market variability are respectively given by the weighted average of individual means
and volatilities. Hence, the market uncertainty will be mainly determined by a single institution
or sector, in the case it contributes more to the aggregate exposure. Stability can be induced
in the whole market in this way. The same results are obtained when individual exposures are
exponentially or Pareto distributed, for in both cases the risk parameters are aggregated whenShort-Run Monetary Equilibrium 75
accounting for market behaviour. Moreover, the model accepts multiple equilibria, since different
combinations of the risk parameters may lead to the same market characterisation.
The terms under which market shocks affect individual expectations about risks will be deter-
mined by speciﬁc conditions, such as the state of aggregation, restrictions in the access to credit,
the distribution of information within the market and the skills and knowledge of investors. Thus,
changes in the aggregate monetary stock may induce intermediaries to prefer bigger or more ef-
ﬁcient companies — ﬂight to quality — a situation that may become more difﬁcult according to
the availability of funds and possibly increment more the riskiness of less productive sectors of the
economy. In this way, within the imperfect competition framework, a broader meaning is attached
to instability.
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Abstract
In short rate interest models, the behaviour of the short rate is given by a stochastic differen-
tial equation (in one-factor models) or a system of stochastic differential equations (in multi-
factor models). Interest rates with different maturities are determined by bond prices, which
are solutions of the parabolic partial differential equation. We consider the generalized Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model, where the short rate is a sum of two Bessel square root processes, which
evolve independently. The bond price is a function of maturity and of the level of each of the
components of the short rate. We do not observe all values necessary to obtain a bond price.
Therefore, we propose the averaging of the bond prices. We consider the limiting distribution
of the short rate components, conditioned to have the sum equal to the observable short rate
level. In this way, we obtain the averaged bond prices, which depend only on maturity and
short rate. We prove that there is no one-factor model yielding the same bond prices as with
the averaged values described above.
1. GENERALIZED COX-INGERSOLL-ROSS MODEL OF INTEREST RATES
Term structure models describe the dependence between the time to maturity of a discount bond
and its present price which implies the interest rate. Continuous short rate models are formulated
in terms of one or more stochastic differential equations for the instanteneous interest rate r (short
rate). The bond prices, and hence the term structures of the interest rates, are then obtained by
solving the partial differential equation.
In one-factor models, the process describing the short rate, is given by
dr = α(t,r)dt + β(t,r)dw, (1)
1The author was supported by the VEGA grant 1/3767/06.
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where α(t,r) and β(t,r) are non-stochastic functions, and w is a Wiener process. If α(t,r) =
κ(θ − r), κ > 0, the process has the property of mean-reversion to the level θ. A popular class
of models is obtained by taking σ(t,r) = σrγ. It includes the Vasicek model [γ = 0, see Vasicek
(1977)], and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model [γ = 1
2 see Cox et al. (1985)]; for a comparison
of models with different values for γ, see e.g. Chan et al. (1992).
If the short rate evolves according to 1, then the discount bond with maturity T has the price













∂r2 − rP = 0, t ∈ (0,T) (2)
P(T,r) = 1, (3)
where λ = λ(t,r) is the market price of risk. The interest rates are then obtained from the bond
prices by R(t,r) = −
logP(t,r)
T−t , see Kwok (1998).
For the speciﬁc choices of the market price of risk in Vasicek and CIR models, it is known that
the bond price can be written in closed form. If λ(t,r) = λ
√
r in the CIR model then the price of
the bond with time to maturity τ = T − t has the form
P(τ,r) = A(τ)e
−B(τ)r.
The functions A(τ) and B(τ) satisfy the following system of ordinary differential equations
˙ A(τ) = κθA(τ)B(τ)





2 + 1 (4)
with initial conditions A(0) = 1, B(0) = 0, which can be solved analytically.
There are several possibilities of generalizing one-factor models, leading to multifactor mod-
els: making a parameter of the one-factor model stochastic (e.g. stochastic volatility models An-
derson and Lund (1996), Fong and Vasicek (1991)), adding extra relevant quantities (consol rate in
Brennan and Schwartz (1982), European interest rate in Corzo Santamaria and Schwartz (2000),
Corzo Santamaria and Biscarri (2005)), composing the short rate by means of more components
(generalized CIR model in Cox et al. (1985), consol rate and the spread between the short rate and
consol rate in Schaefer and Schwartz (1984), Christiansen (2002)), etc.
In the generalized CIR model, the short rate r is the sum of two independent Bessel square root
processes:
r = r1 + r2, (5)
dr1 = κ1(θ1 − r1)dt + σ1
√
r1dw1,
dr2 = κ2(θ2 − r2)dt + σ2
√
r2dw2,
where the Wiener processes w1 and w2 are independent. If the market prices of risk corresponding




r2, then the bond price π(τ,r1,r2) has the form
π(τ,r1,r2) = A(τ)e
−B1(τ)r1−B2(τ)r2, (6)
where A(τ) = A1(τ)A2(τ) with A1(τ), A2(τ), B1(τ), B2(τ) the solutions of the systems of
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2. AVERAGING IN TWO-FACTOR MODELS
Since the components of the short rate r1 and r2 are not observable and the observable variable
is only their sum r, an interesting question refers to the properties of the average of the two bond
prices conditioned on the given sum of r1 and r2. This is motivated by several papers: e.g. Fouque
et al.(2003)withan averaging instochasticvolatilitymodelsofstockprices, orCotton et al. (2004)
with an averaging in stochastic volatility models of bond prices (where the unobservable random
quantity is the volatility), which are used in the series expansion of the prices. The asymptotic
distribution of the hidden process is used. It can be justiﬁed if the processes have been evolving
for a sufﬁciently long time.
In the same way, we consider the limit distributions in the generalized CIR model. It is well
known that the limit distribution of a Bessel square root process is a gamma distribution. Hence













i , bi =
2κiθi
σ2
i for ri > 0 and zero otherwise. The limit density of r1 conditioned on
r1 + r2 = r is equal to
f(r1,r) =
f1(r1)f2(r − r1) R r





where we used M(r) for the denominator of the fraction in order to simplify the notations in the
computations hereafter. The bond price (6) can be written in terms of τ, r, r1 and the averaged




π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1. (8)










In Fig. 1 we give an example, by showing the term structures obtained by the generalized CIR
model and the averaged term structure computed as described above.
3. THE MAIN RESULT
In this paper, we study the following problem: is it possible to ﬁnd functions α and β, see equation
(1), such that the bond prices are the same as the averaged prices from a two-factor CIR model as
in (5).
We restrict ourselves to a speciﬁc class of processes:
• drift and volatility of the process, as well as the market price of risk are time-independent;80 B. Stehl´ ıkov´ a








Figure 1: Examples of term structures corresponding to different pairs of r1 and r2 such that
r1 + r2 = 0.04. The averaged term structure is in bold.
• for a zero level of short rate, we require the volatility to be zero; this condition ensures the
nonnegativity of the short rate;
• the volatility parameters σ are different for the two processes forming the short rate in the
two-factor CIR model.
We start with the following result.
Theorem 3.1 If we assume that the functions α, β, and λ only depend on r (and not on τ), that
the functions α, β, and λ are continuous in r = 0, that β(0) = 0, and that σ1  = σ2, then
(a) P(τ,r) → A(τ) as r → 0,
(b) ∂P
∂τ (τ,r) → ˙ A(τ) as r → 0,
(c) ∂P







as r → 0,
(d) ∂2P
∂r2 (τ,r) is bounded in the neighbourhood of r = 0.
For the proof, we need some properties of the Kummer conﬂuent hypergeometric functions 1F1,
which are recalled in the following lemma, see Abramovitz and Stegun (1972).
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Proof of theorem 3.1:





















f1(r1)f2(r − r1) (10)
=
1









1 (r − r1)
b2−1￿
.
Now, we can prove the assertions of the theorem.






−Br 1F1(b1,b1 + b2,−((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2)r))
1F1(b1,b1 + b2,−(a1 − a2)r)
. (11)
Since both denominator and numerator of the fraction in (11) converge to one as r ap-



















− ( ˙ B1 − ˙ B2)
R r
0 r1π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1 R r
0 π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1
#
, (12)
where ˙ A =
∂A
∂t .
The numerator of the fraction in (12) is positive for all r > 0 and can be bounded from
above by r
R r
0 π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1. Hence the fraction is positive and bounded from
above by r, which implies that it converges to zero as r → 0. Since we already know that
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equation (15) can be rewritten as
∂f
∂r










0 f1(s)f2(r − s)ds
#
. (16)









r−r1π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1 R r





r−r1f1(r1)f2(r − r1)dr1 R r








r−r1π(τ,r1,r − r1)f(r1,r)dr1 R r





r−r1f1(r1)f2(r − r1)dr1 R r





= P(τ,r)[−B2 + (b2 − 1)(X1 − X2)]. (18)




b1 + b2 − 1
b2 − 1
1F1(b1,b1 + b2 − 1,−((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2)r))






b1 + b2 − 1
b2 − 1
1F1(b1,b1 + b2 − 1,−(a1 − a2)r)
1F1(b1,b1 + b2,−(a1 − a2)r)
. (20)Averaged bond prices in generalized Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of interest rates 83
Hence

















G1 = 1F1(b1,b1 + b2 − 1,−((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2))r),
G2 = 1F1(b1,b1 + b2,−((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2))r),
G3 = 1F1(b1,b1 + b2 − 1,−(a1 − a2)r),
G4 = 1F1(b1,b1 + b2,−(a1 − a2)r). (21)
As G2G4 → 1 as r → 0, we need to compute G1G4 − G2G3 to be able to compute the limit
of (17). Starting from
G1 = 1 −
b1
b1 + b2 − 1
((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2))r + o(r),
G2 = 1 −
b1
b1 + b2
((B1 − B2) + (a1 − a2))r + o(r),
G3 = 1 −
b1
b1 + b2 − 1
(a1 − a2)r + o(r),
G4 = 1 −
b1
b1 + b2
(a1 − a2)r + o(r), (22)
we have
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P(τ,r)[−B2 + (b2 − 1)(X1 − X2)]
= A
￿
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(d) We show that there is a ﬁnite limit of ∂2P
∂r2 (τ,r) as r → 0, from which the boundedness
follows.





[−B2 + (b2 − 1)(X1 − X2)] + P
∂ [−B2 + (b2 − 1)(X1 − X2)]
∂r
.
From the deﬁnition of X1 and X2 and from their limits, it follows that it is sufﬁcient to show














With F(r) written by means of a series expansion F(r) =
P∞
k=0 akrk, the condition a0 = 0







in the neighbourhood of r = 0, which
holds for (24).
This leads us to the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.3 Under the hypotheses of theorem 3.1, there is no one-factor interest rate model for
which the averaged bond prices satisfy the PDE up to the boundary r = 0.
Proof. By taking the limit r → 0 in the PDE (2), we know from the previous theorem that for all
τ > 0










From this we calculate the value of the function α for r = 0:





















is a constant, independent of τ.
Now we use the fact that the function A(τ) in the two-factor CIR model can be written as
A(τ) = A1(τ)A2(τ), where A1(τ) and A2(τ) are functions of the original CIR models, corre-
sponding to each of the equations for r1 and r2. Hence they satisfy
˙ Ai(τ) = κiθiAi(τ)Bi(τ) (i = 1,2)
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κ1θ1B1(τ) + κ2θ2B2(τ) = K(b1B1(τ) + b2B2(τ))
and so
(κ1θ1 − Kb1)B1(τ) = (Kb2 − κ2θ2)B2(τ)
for each τ > 0. This is only possible in two cases:
1. κ1θ1 − Kb1 = 0 and Kb2 − κ2θ2 = 0,
2. B1(τ) = cB2(τ) for some constant c.
Let us look at each of these possibilities.
1. The same constant K appears in both conditions. From the ﬁrst one we get K =
κ1θ1
b1 and by
substituting the value of b1 =
2κ1θ1
σ2
1 , we obtain K =
σ2
1
2 . In the same way, from the second
equality we obtain K =
σ2
2
2 . However, we started from the hypothesis that σ2
1  = σ2
2, and thus
we ﬁnd a contradiction.
2. We recall the equations for B1 and B2 from the CIR model:






2 − 1. (26)
If B1(τ) = cB2(τ), it follows that
c
￿














for all τ > 0. By continuity, the equality also holds for the limit τ = 0+. Taking this limit,
we get c = 1, and hence the functions B1(τ) and B2(τ) coincide. We denote this function
by B(τ). Subtracting the two equations in (26), we obtain:
















and dividing by B(τ) (which is nonzero)











Since σ1  = σ2, this implies that B(τ) is a constant function, which is a contradiction.
Since both possibilities lead to a contradiction, the theorem is proved.86 B. Stehl´ ıkov´ a
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered two-factor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross models for interest rates and averaged
bond prices with respect to the asymptotic distribution of the short rate processes, conditioned
on the observable short rate level. Such averaged values are functions of the maturity and of the
short rate, just as the solutions of one-factor models. Hence we studied the question, whether there
would be a one-factor model yielding the same bond prices as those obtained by averaging in the
two-factor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model. We proved that the answer is negative. In the future, we
plan to study this question also for other two-factor models.
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De “Actuarial and Financial Mathematics Day” is een vaste waarde geworden als contactforum. Niet alleen 
academici maar ook heel wat collega's uit de bank- en verzekeringswereld blijven de weg vinden naar dit 
jaarlijkse evenement. Het is de gelegenheid bij uitstek om op de hoogte te blijven van het recente onderzoek op 
het vlak van financiële en actuariële wiskunde niet alleen in België maar ook daarbuiten. Naast twee 
gastsprekers kwamen doctoraatsstudenten, postdocs en mensen uit de bedrijfswereld aan bod. Voor deze editie 
werd geopteerd voor wat minder sprekers om hen langer aan het woord te laten en om tijd te laten voor 
discussie. We danken hierbij in het bijzonder de discussanten als gangmakers van deze discussies.  
In deze publicatie vindt u een neerslag van een aantal voorgestelde onderwerpen. De onderwerpen kunnen 
gesitueerd worden in het ruime gebied van financiële en actuariële toepassingen van wiskunde, maar met een 
grote variatie: de bijdragen betreffen “capital allocation” problemen, “variance reduction” methoden, hedging en 
equilibrium vraagstukken, exotische opties en rentemodellen. 